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I. INTRODUCTION
W HEN viewed in the context of the cyclical progressions of
*$American politics,' the timing of the recently announced
Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the National Association of At-
torneys General (NAAG Guidelines) may portend a new, harder
hitting, more active antitrust policy on the horizon. 2 These polit-
ical cycles suggest that a more active antitrust policy may be in the
offing. When the current cycle began in the 1960s, the United
States Supreme Court (the Warren Court) seemed to use section
7 of the Clayton Act 3 to invalidate any nontrivial acquisition of a
* Associate Professor of Economics, The City University of New York. B.A.
1962, Harvard University; J.D. 1967, Stanford University; Ph.D. 1975, Columbia
University.
1. A. SCHLEISHINGER, JR., THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1986).
2. NAAG Horizontal Merger Guidelines, (CCH) Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No.
800 Pt. II, at 67 (March 16, 1987) [hereinafter NAAG Guidelines].
3. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the
Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, provides in part that: "No corporation en-
gaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of
the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of
(281)
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competitor.4 The elimination of a significant rival by itself was
thought to infringe the complex of social and economic values
perceived by a majority of the Court to inform the statutory words
"may ... substantially.., lessen competition."' 5 Apparently frus-
trated by this strict antimerger policy, Justice Stewart uttered his
famous remark in dissent in United States v. Von's Grocery Co.: "The
sole consistency that I can find is that in litigation under § 7, the
Government always wins."' 6 The Department of Justice's 1968
Merger Guidelines with its low concentration thresholds reflected
this case law. 7
The 1970s witnessed a growing disenchantment with an ac-
tivist antimerger policy. The attack on the activist antitrust policy
the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets
of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of com-
merce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." Id.
4. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States
v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Continental Can
Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271
(1964); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
5. Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 1975 (1987).
6. 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting). In Von's Grocery,
Von's, ranked third among retail grocery store chains in the Los Angeles area,
acquired the sixth largest chain-Shopping Bag Food Stores. Their market
shares were 4.3% and 3.2% respectively, or a combined market share of 7.5%.
The acquisition was denied, although neither firm involved was really very big,
nor was the market highly concentrated by usual standards. The concentration
ratio in terms of the largest four firms, CR4, was 24.4% before the merger and
28.8% after.
7. See generally Department of Justice, 1968 Merger Guidelines, 2 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) (1968) 4510 (Aug. 9, 1968); ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) No. 360 at X-I to X-6 (June 4, 1968) (full text of Justice Department
Merger Guidelines). In particular, paragraphs 5 through 7 are indicative of the
stringent antimerger standards reflected in the guidelines. Paragraphs 5
through 7 state in full:
5. Market Highly Concentrated. In a market in which the shares of
the four largest firms amount to approximately 75% or more, the De-
partment will ordinarily challenge mergers between firms accounting
for, approximately, the following percentages of the market:
Acquiring Firm Acquired Firm
4% 4% or more
10% 2% or more
15% plus 1% or more
(percentages not shown in the above table should be interpolated pro-
portionately to the percentages that are shown).
6. Market Less Highly Concentrated. In a market in which the
shares of the four largest firms amount to less than approximately 75%,
the Department will ordinarily challenge mergers between firms ac-
counting for, approximately, the following percentages of the market:
2
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was led by "Chicago School"8 theorists, who argued that effi-
ciency is the only legitimate goal of antitrust policy.9 In most ex-
treme form, Chicago-oriented authors castigate those who
advocate any other goals, even those with clear support in legisla-
tive history (e.g., the desire to maintain a decentralized economy),
as populist nonsense.' 0 Changing economic conditions aided the
Chicago School attack. The erosion of the American producers'
market power by fiercely efficient foreign competitors tended to
make an activist antitrust policy less necessary. 1' Moreover, with
inflation and unemployment undermining hopes for a higher
standard of living, antitrust law was blamed for preventing effi-
cient mergers and hindering American businesses from compet-
Acquiring Firm Acquired Firm
5% 5% or more
10% 4% or more
15% 3% or more
20% 2% or more
25% plus 1% or more
(percentages not shown in the above table should be interpolated pro-
portionately to the percentages that are shown).
7. Market With Trend Toward Concentration. The Department ap-
plies an additional, stricter standard in determining whether to chal-
lenge mergers occurring in any market, not wholly unconcentrated, in
which there is a significant trend toward increased concentration. Such
a trend is considered to be present when the aggregate market share of
any grouping of the largest firms in the market from the two largest to
the eight largest has increased by approximately 7% or more of the
market over a period of time extending from any base year 5-10 years
prior to the merger (excluding any year in which some abnormal fluctu-
ation in market shares occurred) up to the time of the merger. The
Department will ordinarily challenge any acquisition, by any firm in a
grouping of such largest firms whose market share amounts to approxi-
mately 2% or more.
Id.
Note, however, Baker and Blumenthal's comment on the 1968 Guidelines
which follows: "The day has long passed since the principle consistency of
merger litigation was that 'the Government always wins.' That former reality
had given the 1968 Merger Guidelines a special importance." Baker & Blumen-
thal, The 1982 Guidelines and Preexisting Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 311, 346 (1983).
8. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925
(1979).
9. "The only legitimate goal of American antitrust law is the maximization
of consumer welfare." R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 51 (1978); accord GAF
Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203, 1226 (S.D. N.Y. 1981); R. Pos-
NER, ANTITRUST LAw 3-4 (1976); Calvani, Consumer Welfare is Prime Objective of Anti-
trust, Legal Times, Dec. 1984, at 24-31; see also 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW 103-113(c) (1978).
10. Sullivan, The New Merger Guidelines: An Afterward, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 632,
636 (1983).
11. See I. MAGAZINER & R. REICH, MINDING AMERICA'S BUSINESS, pt. 1
(1982).
3
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ing more successfully in domestic and international markets.' 2
In 1980, the election of Ronald Reagan as President reflected
the changed political mood of the country. Mr. Reagan promised
to restore the economy to its former vigor by reducing govern-
ment regulation of business.' 3 A restricted vision of antitrust fit
nicely with the political philosophy and campaign commitment of
his administration.' 4 The Department of Justice's Horizontal
Merger Guidelines (DOJ Guidelines),' 5 announced in 1982 and
hastily revised in more lenient form two years later,' 6 reflected
that view. In actual practice, the Reagan administration's en-
forcement of section 7 of the Clayton Act has been still more leni-
ent than the DOJ Guidelines.' 7 With the appointment of Reagan
nominees to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), it too
adopted a more conservative view of merger enforcement' 8 to the
degree that FTC Commissioner Bailey remarked in her dissent in
12. Fox, Introduction, (Symposium): 1982 Merger Guidelines: When Economists
Are Kings?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 281, 283 (1983).
13. Sheils, Thomas, Abraham & Lubenow, An Economic Dream in Peril, News-
week, Sept. 8, 1980, at 50-51.
14. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L.
REV. 1140, 1140-46 (1981).
15. 1982 Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28, 493 (1982) [hereinafter 1982
DOJ Guidelines].
16. 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984) [hereinafter 1984
DOJ Guidelines]. The 1984 DOJ Guidelines increased the number of defenses
and added other factors which could reduce the significance of concentration
levels from 10 to 14; added a failing division to the failing firm defense; and
added an efficiency defense where the 1982 Guidelines indicated that the DOJ
would consider efficiency claims only in "extraordinary cases." In 1984, the
Guidelines changed the "five-percent market definition test to a flexible stan-
dard, defined the price for which an increase would be postulated in the market
definition standard as the prevailing price (even if such price is significantly
above marginal cost), changed the Post-Merger HHI below 1000 standard from
"the Department is unlikely to challenge mergers in this region" to "the Depart-
ment will not challenge mergers falling in this region," and changed from a cau-
tious approach to applying its market definition standards to foreign
competitors to one of applying its market definition standards equally to both
foreign and domestic firms. Statement Accompanying Release of Revised Merger Guide-
lines, 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (June 29, 1984). The 1984
DOJ Guidelines go substantially beyond clarification, enunciating changes in en-
forcement policy that are substantial in nature; these substantial changes will
prolong any merger cases that are brought by widening the opportunities for
defense. See generally Miller, Notes on the 1984 Merger Guidelines: Clarification of the
Policy or Repeal of the Celler-Kefauver Act?, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 653 (1984).
17. 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1245, at 1056 (Dec. 19,
1985). For further discussion of the Reagan administration's lenient approach
to antitrust enforcement, see infra notes 144-85 and accompanying text.
18. When the FTC became "populist" in the late 1970s, Congress reigned
it in through legislation and cuts in appropriations. Baker & Blumenthal, supra
note 7, at 321.
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In re Echlin Manufacturing Co. that "[w]hat is emerging in Commis-
sion merger decisions is by and large the rule that, according to
the 'new' economic learning, a merger is almost always legal." 19
Thus, we have come full circle from Justice Stewart's diametrically
opposite remark in Von's Grocery two decades ago.
Four recent developments suggest that a new phase of the
cycle may be in the offing. First, there has been a wave of mergers
that have been notable in producing huge wealth transfers with-
out any discernible increase in production or efficiency. 20 There
has also been growing public and congressional revulsion at the
excesses of financial manipulation (e.g., leveraged buyouts, 21
"greenmail, " 22 "poison pills" 23), which are evidence that decision
making by corporate management in large corporations and by
corporate raiders may not be as effectively constrained by effi-
ciency considerations as the apostles of a laissez-faire attitude to-
ward mergers would have one believe. Second, the huge
American trade deficit appears to be generating an irresistible
momentum for protectionist legislation 24 which is likely to en-
hance the market power of domestic firms as well as their propen-
sity to engage in explicit or implicit cartels. Moreover, the recent
rapid decline in the dollar relative to other currencies will, by al-
tering the terms of trade in favor of American producers, have the
same effect as protectionist legislation: foreign producers will
have more difficulty competing in American markets. Just as the
slogan, "tariff is the most of trusts," was the rallying cry of those
who demanded the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890 (as the
quid pro quo for the McKinley Tariff of that same year),25 protec-
tionist legislation and the fall of the dollar, which enhance the
19. 105 F.T.C. 410, 502-03 (1985) (Bailey, Comm'r, dissenting). Echlin in-
volved a merger between two firms which manufactured carburetor kits.
Although the merging firms are the first and third largest, having market shares
of approximately 38% and 10% respectively, a majority of the FTC voted not to
challenge the merger because of competition from substitute products, low en-
try barriers, and the prospect of new technology. Id. at 413-18.
20. Business Week, Nov. 24, 1986, at 86; N.Y. Times,June 29, 1987, at D1;
see L. THUROW, DANGEROUS CURRENTS: THE STATE OF ECONOMICS, ch. 2 (1984).
21. See generally Note, Leveraged Buyout, Management Buyout, and Going Private
Corporate Control Transactions: Insider Trading or Efficient Market Economics?, 14
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 685 (1986).
22. See generally Comment, Greenmail: Can the Abuses Be Stopped, 80 Nw. U.L.
REV. 1271 (1986).
23. See generally Comment, Corporate Law-The "Poison Pill" as a Takeover De-
fense Tactic-Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1047
(1986).
24. N.Y. Times, July 9, 1987, at D1.
25. D. DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW 143 (1964); H. THORELLI,
1988] 285
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market power of domestic firms, are likely to agitate an activist
antimerger policy. Third, despite the Administration's lenient
antimerger policy, 26 the economic position of American firms vis
vis foreign firms in terms of productivity has not improved; in-
deed, the secular trend in productivity has continued to decline.2 7
Fourth, dissatisfaction with the Reagan administration's lenient
merger policy caused the National Association of Attorneys Gen-
eral (NAAG), who are authorized, both by statute28 and case law29
to enforce the federal antitrust laws, to take the unprecedented
step of issuing their own guidelines for the enforcement of the
federal antitrust laws. The NAAG vertical restraint guidelines
were announced in 1985,30 and the horizontal merger guidelines
announced in 1987. 3 1
Because political economy is not an exact science and cannot
prove conclusively whether an aggressive or a conservative anti-
trust policy is more conducive to greater public benefit, political
and intellectual cycles or fashions have been and will continue to
be very important to understand, to analyze and, indeed, to shape
the subject of political economy. For example, if we consider the
phenomenon of a market in which a dominant firm survives un-
challenged and earns supernormal profits for a considerable pe-
riod of time, we shall see that economists who use different
models to interpret this phenomenon arrive at different conclu-
sions. There are two differences in the models used: one focuses
on the concept of barriers to entry into such a market, the other
focuses primarily on the presumed efficiency of large firms. Chi-
THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 164-232 (1954); Letwin, Congress and the Sherman
Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 221 (1956).
26. For a discussion of the Reagan administration's lenient enforcement at-
titude and practice, see infra text accompanying notes 149-85.
27. N.Y. Times, June 29, 1987, at DI; see also L. THUROW, supra note 20, ch.
20.
28. The Clayton Act, section 4C, states in pertinent part:
(1) Any attorney general of a State may bring a civil action in the
name of such State, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons re-
siding in such State, in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the defendant, to secure monetary relief as provided in
this section for injury sustained by such natural persons to their prop-
erty by reason of any violation of sections 1 to 7 of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(l) (1982).
29. The authority of the Attorney General of a State to invoke section 7 of
the Clayton Act to enjoin a merger injurious to the general welfare and economy
of a State is confirmed in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
30. NAAG s Vertical Restraint Guidelines, 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1245, at 996 (Dec. 5, 1985).
31. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, at pt. 11-67.
286 [Vol. 33: p. 281
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cago School authors believe that competition erodes entry barri-
ers rather quickly (with the exception of governmentally imposed
barriers); therefore, Chicago School authors conclude that if a
firm has a long-term record of profitability, it must be due to effi-
ciency. 32 Chicago School opponents, on the other hand, maintain
that the sustained profitability of many firms is not due to effi-
ciency but due to durable barriers to entry, such as advertising
intensity, scale economies, absolute capital requirements, natural-
resource monopoly, patent protection, strategic predation 33 and
the like.3 4 In the 1980's, the laissez-faire conclusions of the Chi-
cago School model have appeared to be more consonant with the
conservative phase of the American political cycle. However, if
this conservative phase has about run its course, the conclusions
of models that emphasize the need for a more active antitrust pol-
icy may again become fashionable.
Part II is a summary of the article's conclusions. Part III con-
trasts the antitrust philosophies and policies underlying the DOJ
and NAAG Guidelines. Part IV explains the three step process
that both DOJ and NAAG Guidelines use to determine whether a
merger may substantially lessen competition. Part V contains an
analysis of the DOJ and NAAG product and geographic market
definition standards in the context of recent merger cases and
consent degrees. In Part VI, the stated concentration level stan-
dard of the DOJ (which was also adopted by the NAAG) is com-
pared to the DOJ's actual performance as indicated by merger
cases and consent decrees. In Part VII, other factors (e.g., ease of
32. Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRA-
TION: THE NEW LEARNING 164 (H. Goldschmid, H.M. Mann, andJ. Weston, eds.
1974); see also G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 72-80 (1968);
Pautler, A Review of the Economic Basis for Broad-Based Horizontal-Merger Policy, 28
ANTITRUST BULL. 571, 633-35 (1983).
33. 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS 26-30 (1975).
34. The traditional discussions of barriers began with Bain. See J. BAIN,
BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956). They continued with the work of Mann.
See Mann, Seller Concentration, Barriers to Entry and Rates of Return in Thirty Industries,
1950-60, 48 REV. ECON. & STAT. 296 (1966). More recently Caves, Gale and
Porter and others popularized the idea of mobility barriers among firms within
an industry, and other researchers have extended the theoretical discussion of
entry barriers to include strategic elements, such as preemptive capacity, capac-
ity expansion or patent accumulation, product proliferation, first-mover advan-
tages and learning-curve effects, to mention a few. See Caves, Gale & Porter,
Interfirm Profitability Differences: Comment, 91 QUART. J. ECON. 676 (1977); see also
Schmalensee, Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry, 9 BELLJ.
ECON. 305 (1978); Spence, The Learning Curve and Competition, 12 BELLJ. ECON.
49 (1981). For a more extensive bibliography, see Paulter, supra note 32, at 633-
35.
1988]
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entry), which affect the significance of concentration level stan-
dard, are discussed: the DOJ's thirteen factors are compared to
the NAAG's four. The final section contains conclusions and
some speculation as to the future of antimerger policy.
II. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
The DOJ and NAAG Horizontal Guidelines adopted nearly
identical concentration level standards for mergers subject to sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act.3 5 Their main differences concern:
1) policy assumptions, 2) market definition methodologies, and
3) factors other than concentration levels which should affect the
decision whether to challenge a merger. With respect to the
DOJ's stated policy assumptions (as opposed to its actions), the
DOJ Guidelines are eclectic and roughly in the mainstream. The
NAAG Guidelines, on the other hand, contain a statement of poli-
cies that can only be read as a counter attack on the Chicago
School position that allocative efficiency is the only goal of anti-
trust policy. The NAAG Guidelines state that allocative efficiency
is subsidiary to the central purpose of section 7 which is to pre-
vent firms from attaining market or monopoly power to prevent a
transfer of wealth from consumers to such firms.3 6
With respect to product and geographic market definitions,
the DOJ Guidelines are hypothetical and future oriented. 37 They
tend to be biased in favor of broad markets and therefore may
systematically understate market shares used to calculate market
concentration, with the result that fewer mergers will be chal-
lenged. Recent merger cases and consent decrees demonstrate
that the hypothetical and speculative market definitions in the
DOJ Guidelines are generally unworkable in the context of litiga-
tion.38 On the other hand, the NAAG market definitions, which
use historical data, are similar to those which the courts have tra-
ditionally employed. 39 Since the NAAG market definitions rely
on historical data, they may be biased toward narrower markets,
and may tend to overstate market shares used to calculate market
35. See 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, § 3; NAAG Guidelines, supra
note 2, § 4.
36. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 2.
37. See 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, § 2.
38. For a detailed discussion of this point, see infra notes 67-143 and ac-
companying text.
39. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 3.
288 [Vol. 33: p. 281
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concentration. 40
The analysis of recent merger cases and consent decrees in
this article shows that the DOJ has apparently not been imple-
menting the concentration standard in its own Guidelines. 41 (The
NAAG, which adopted the DOJ's concentration standard, would
presumably adhere more closely to it than the DOJ has.) It will
appear later in this discussion that a major reason for the incon-
sistency between the DOJ's stated policy and its actions may be
that its Guidelines are based on the incompatible assumptions
and methodologies of two rival schools of economic thought.
The DOJ's actual policy guide may possibly be inferred from a
footnote in its 1982 Guidelines where it stated that "[t]here is
some economic evidence that, where one or two firms dominate a
market, the creation of a strong third firm enhances competi-
tion."'42 Given the reluctance of the DOJ to challenge mergers, it
has been suggested that the stated threshold level of concentra-
tion at which mergers may be challenged should be raised.43
With respect to what factors other than concentration levels
should affect a decision whether to challenge a merger, the DOJ
Guidelines take a flexible approach. When the DOJ revised its
Guidelines in 1984, it increased the number of other factors and
defenses from ten to fourteen. 44 The other factors and defenses
were probably expanded in order to undercut the concentration
level standard and to bring the Guidelines more into conformity
with its lenient enforcement policy. In current form, the DOJ
Guidelines include virtually any economic rationale which would
allow the merged firms to demonstrate that concentration levels
overstate their actual market power. On the other hand, the
NAAG Guidelines, which emphasize the concentration level stan-
dard as a true guideline, limit the number of other factors and
defenses that may affect the significance of market share and con-
centration levels to four.4 5
40. For a discussion and empirical verification of this point, see infra text
accompanying notes 67-143.
41. 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1245, at 1056 (Dec. 19,
1985).
42. For a discussion of the concentration standards used to establish a prima
facie case of an antitrust violation, see infra text accompanying notes 144-85.
43. 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1245, at 1056 (Dec. 19,
1985). For a discussion of whether threshold concentration levels should be
raised, see infra notes 144-85 and accompanying text.
44. For a discussion of the Revised DOJ Guidelines, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 186-212.
45. There are three other factors plus a failing firm defense. See NAAG
1988] 289
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III. THE DOJ AND NAAG GUIDELINES: A COMPARISON
OF POLICIES
In the DOJ Guidelines, "market power" is defined as the abil-
ity of one or more firms to maintain prices above competitive
levels profitably for a significant period of time.46 Market power
may be achieved either by a single seller (monopolist) or a few
sellers who explicitly or implicitly (tacitly) coordinate their actions
to approximate the performance of a monopolist.47 With respect
to the policies underlying the DOJ Guidelines, the DOJ states that
mergers which create or enhance market power are undesirable
because the "result is a transfer of wealth from buyers to sellers
and a misallocation of resources." 48 DOJ Guidelines give equal
weight to and do not distinguish between the goals of preventing
wealth transfers and preventing resource misallocation; thus, lit-
erally they do not endorse the Chicago School position that the
sole goal of antitrust policy is the efficient allocation of resources.
The DOJ Guidelines also state that "[w]hile challenging competi-
tively harmful mergers, the Department seeks to avoid unneces-
sary interference with that larger universe of mergers that are
either competitively beneficial or neutral." 49 Lastly, the DOJ
states that "the Guidelines reflect congressional intent that
merger enforcement should interdict competitive problems in
their incipiency." 50 The incipiency standard echoes the Supreme
Court's opinion in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States.5' Thus, on its
face, if not in practice, the DOJ statement of purpose and under-
lying policy assumptions is squarely in the mainstream.
The NAAG Guidelines, on the other hand, contain a state-
Guidelines, supra note 2, §§ 5-6. For a discussion of these factors, see infra notes
186-212 and accompanying text.
46. "Market power" also encompasses the ability of a single buyer or group
of buyers to depress the price paid for a product to a level that is below the
competitive price. See 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, § 1.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Bethelem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.
N.Y. 1958) (Congress in framing antitrust laws was clearly concerned with "con-
centration in an oligopoly framework" as an instance of a "trend to create
monopoly.")
48. See 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, § 1.
49. See id. "The Guidelines are designed primarily to indicate when the De-
partment is likely to challenge mergers, not how it will conduct the litigation of
cases that it decides to bring." Id.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962). The Supreme Court said, "It is apparent that
a keystone in the erection of a barrier to what Congress saw was the rising tide of
economic concentration, was its provision of authority for arresting mergers at a
time when the trend to a lessening of competition in a line of commerce was still
in its incipiency." Id.
290 [Vol. 33: p. 281
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ment of policies that can only be read as a counter attack on the
Chicago position that the sole goal of antitrust policy is the effi-
cient allocation of resources. Although neither the Chicago
School nor any of its leading authors are explicitly mentioned, the
NAAG policy statement says that:
The central purpose of [§ 7 of the Clayton Act] is to pre-
vent firms from attaining market or monopoly power,
because firms possessing such power can raise prices to
consumers above competitive levels, thereby effecting a
transfer of wealth from consumers to such firms ...
Such mergers were prohibited even prior to the actual
attainment or exercise of market power, that is, when the
trend to harmful concentration was incipient .... Other
goals of the law were the prevention of excessive levels
of industrial concentration because of the political and
social effects of concentrated economic power and the
fostering of productive efficiency, organizational diver-
sity, technological innovation and the maintenance of
opportunities for small and regional businesses to com-
pete .... The Congress evidenced little or no concern
for allocative efficiency when it enacted section 7 and the
other antitrust laws. . . . Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has clearly ruled that any conflict between the goal
of preventing anticompetitive mergers and that of in-
creasing efficiency must be resolved in favor of the for-
mer explicit and predominant concern of the
Congress. 52
The Supreme Court decisions on which the NAAG policy state-
ment relies for support are from the 1960s: Brown Shoe v. United
States,53 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co. ,54 United States v. Philadelphia
National Bank. 55 In two subsequent cases from the 1970's, United
52. NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 2; see also Lande, Wealth Transfers as the
Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34
HAST. L. REV. 65 (1982); Salop & Krattenmaker, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising
Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986). For excellent
summaries of arguments regarding the wisdom of a large number of possible
antitrust goals, see Bork, Blake, Bowman & Jones The Goals of Antitrust: A Dia-
logue in Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965); Flynn, AntitrustJurisprudence: A Sym-
posium on the Economic, Political and Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REV.
1183 (1977). For a history of this debate, see Blake &Jones, In Defense of Anti-
trust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 377-82 (1965).
53. 370 U.S. 294, 315-16 (1962).
54. 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967).
55. 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963).
1988]
11
Cirace: The Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice and
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1988
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
States v. General Dynamics Corp. ,56 and United States v. Citizens &
Southern National Bank, 57 the Supreme court refused to equate the
possession of a significant market share with a significant threat to
competition. 58 On the other hand, these two cases have highly
unusual facts that required discounting large market shares5 9 and
the decisions from the 1960s have not been overruled.
The Chicago School position is further attacked in footnotes
of the NAAG Guidelines, where it is explained that proper legisla-
tive function is to make basic policy choices, whether or not those
choices coincide with the beliefs of a particular administration,
enforcement agency, or school of economic theory;60 that in most
mergers creating market power, the effect of the wealth transfer
from consumers will be many times as great quantitatively as the
effect on allocative efficiency; 6 1 that allocative efficiency is an in-
adequate goal since it can be achieved in an economy with mas-
sive inequalities of income distribution; 62 and that the term of art,
"consumer welfare," used by Chicago School authors, 63 refers to
56. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
57. 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
58. The cases relied upon by the NAAG for its policy statement were War-
ren Court cases. However, both General Dynamics and Citizens & Southern National
Bank are Burger Court cases. The speculation as to the different approaches
taken by these two courts in the judicial implementation, if you will, of antitrust
policy may illuminate why the NAAG looked to cases like Brown Shoe. Consider
in this context the following thought on the impetus behind the Burger Court's
antitrust decisions. The Burger Court dismantled the Warren Court's "simpli-
fied test of illegality" when almost always the government won, and resurrected
"the rule of reason approach" where "nothing short of proof of present anticom-
petitive effect would be sufficient to meet the 'lessen competition' standard of
section 7." Lurie, Mergers Under the Burger Court: An Anti-Antitrust Bias and It's
Implications, 23 VILL. L. REV. 213, 214 (1978) (emphasis in original).
59. In General Dynamics, the market shares were of current sales (of coal)
made pursuant to long-term contracts entered into a long time ago; future sales
would depend on uncommitted reserves, and one of the acquired firms had no
uncommitted reserves. 417 U.S. 486 (1986). In Citizens & Southern, the acquired
banks were already under the effective control of the acquirer (they were its "de
facto branches "), so that the formal merger had little competitive significance.
442 U.S. 86 (1975); see Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1975 (1987).
60. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 1 n.7 (emphasis added).
61. Harris &Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An Integrated Approach, 72 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1984). Economists who have attempted to determine the
welfare losses due to monopoly have come up with estimates from as little as
.1% of Gross National Product to as much as 13%. Compare Harberger, Monopoly
and Resource Allocation, 44 AMER. ECON. REV. 77 (1954) with Cowling & Mueller,
The Social Costs of Monopoly Power, 88 ECON.J. 727 (1978). See Pautler, supra note
32, at 576.
62. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 2 n. 15.
63. "The only legitimate goal of American antitrust law is the maximization
of consumer welfare." R. BORK, supra note 9, at 51; accord GAF Corp. v. Eastman
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allocative efficiency and "has nothing to do with the welfare of
consumers."64
IV. THE PROCESS OF DETERMINING WHETHER A MERGER
CREATES OR ENHANCES MARKET POWER
Since the object of antitrust policy is to challenge mergers
that result in market power, it would be preferable if direct evi-
dence of market power were available. Direct evidence would be
data on the spread between the merging firms' marginal cost and
the prices they charge, or data on their long term profit rates.
However, because the relevant data is either unavailable or se-
verely biased when available, 65 both the DOJ and NAAG Guide-
lines determine whether a merger will result in market power
indirectly by the following three-step process: (1) the product
and geographic markets of the merging firms are defined; (2) the
level of concentration in the market and its increase is compared
to the standard stated in the Guidelines; and (3) if the post-
merger concentration level is less than the lowest concentration
threshold allowed by the standard, a merger will not be chal-
lenged by the DOJ 66 and is unlikely to be challenged according to
the NAAG Guidelines. 67 If the concentration level exceeds the
standard, other factors (e.g., the level of entry barriers) are
weighed against the absolute concentration level and its increase
in order to determine whether the merger is likely to lessen com-
petition substantially, and therefore whether it should be chal-
lenged. 68 The major differences in the DOJ and NAAG
Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203, 1226 (S.D. N.Y. 1981); R. POSNER, supra note 9,
at 3-4; Calvani, supra note 9, at 24-31; see also 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
note 9, 103-113(c).
64. NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 2 n.15.
65. M. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY: A PROVISION TEXT 96, 140 (1962); G.
STIGLER, supra note 32, ch.13; McGee, Efficiency and Economies of Size, in INDUS-
TRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 55 (H. Goldschmid, H.M. Mann,
andJ. Weston, eds. 1974).
66. Compare the DOJ's 1982 and 1984 Guidelines: Section III.A. 1.(a) of
the DOJ 1982 Guidelines states that "[tihe Department is unlikely to challenge
mergers falling in this region [post-merger HHI below 1000]." Section 3.11,
1984 DOJ Guidelines states that "[t]he Department will not challenge mergers
falling in this region [post-merger HHI below 1000]." For a further discussion,
see infra text accompanying notes 142-76.
67. Section 4, footnote 32 of the NAAG Guidelines states that "[t]he Attor-
neys General are unlikely to challenge any merger in an industry with a post-
merger HHI of less than 1000." See infra text accompanying notes 142-76.
68. Compare 1984 DOJ Guidelines supra note 16, §§ 3.2-3.5 with NAAG
Guidelines, supra note 2, §§ 5.1-5.3. See infra text accompanying notes 142-83.
This three step process which indirectly measures market power was accepted by
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Guidelines concern market definitions and the number of other
factors that are allowed to affect the significance of concentration
levels. Both sets of guidelines will be compared in the context of
recent antitrust merger cases and consent decrees.
V. PRODUCT AND GEOGRAPHIC MARKET DEFINITION
The 1982 DOJ Guidelines define markets by postulating a
small but significant and nontransitory price increase for each
product of each merging firm at that firm's location. Market defi-
nition is further informed by speculation on the likely responses
of buyers, sellers of the same products, sellers located in other
areas, sellers of substitute products, and sellers with flexible pro-
duction processes which could produce the relevant product. 69 If
competitive responses would cause the price increase to be un-
profitable, then the area and group of products are expanded to
include additional products and areas until a price increase would
be profitable. At the point which it would be profitable for a hy-
pothetical monopolist in that area to impose a small but signifi-
cant and nontransitory increase in price, the monopolist's group
of products and its geographic area are considered to be a mar-
ket. This concept defines the so-called product and geographic
markets.70 In short, the 1982 DOJ Guidelines define a market by
postulating a hypothetical cartel composed of all those firms
within a geographical area that produce the product or products
of the merging firms and then ask whether the cartel could sustain
a hypothetical 5% increase for each product of each merging
firm. If the cartel could not sustain the price increase due to com-
petition from other firms, those other firms are included in the
cartel and so on until such a price increase could be sustained.
The firms in this hypothetical cartel comprise the market.
Although the DOJ stated in its 1984 Revised Guidelines that
"[p]erhaps the single most important contribution of the 1982
Guidelines was the development of a clear, economically sound
the Supreme Court in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321
(1963).
69. See 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, § 2. In Brown Shoe Co., the
Supreme Court said that "[t]he outer boundaries of a product market are deter-
mined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of de-
mands between the product itself and substitutes for it." 370 U.S. 294, 325
(1962).
70. The DOJ product and geographic market definition was published a
year after and seems to have been influenced by Landes & Posner, Market Power
in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981). See also F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, 60 (2d ed. 1980).
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framework for defining markets within which to analyze merg-
ers," 7' its market definitions are the most criticized and least suc-
cessful aspect of the Guidelines. 72  Critics immediately
complained that postulating a rigid five percent increase over the
prevailing price is arbitrary in three ways. First, there is no theo-
retical justification for choosing exactly five percent. 73 (Why not
three, eight or ten percent?) In its Revised Guidelines, the DOJ
responded to that criticism by stating that it "may at times postu-
late a price increase that is much larger or smaller than five per-
cent, depending on the nature of the industry involved." 74
Second, since the DOJ market definition employs prevailing
prices,75 the higher the prices that the merging firms charge rela-
tive to marginal cost, the easier it is for distant firms to compete
in the relevant market, and thus, the broader the market defini-
tion. 76 Wide markets will include more competitors and make the
merger appear more competitive than it is in actuality and less
likely to be challenged. Thus, DOJ market definitions are theo-
retically biased in favor of more lenient treatment of mergers in
markets in which existing firms already have market power.
Third, the DOJ market definition is vulnerable to the same
criticism that the Supreme Court's analysis in United States v. E.L
duPont de Nemours & Co. 77 (the Cellophane case) is subject to. In
duPont, the Court assumed that products are substitutes just be-
cause they exhibit a high cross elasticity of demand 78 at prevailing
prices. 79 In the Cellophane case, there may have been a high
71. See Statement Accompanying Release of Revised Merger Guidelines 1984 DOJ
Guidelines, supra note 16, § 1.
72. The 1982 Guidelines' use of hypothetical firms is inconsistent with
commercial reality. Harris &Jorde, supra note 61, at 465; Ordover & Willig, The
1982 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines: An Economic Assessment, 71 CALIF. L.
REV. 535, 540 (1983).
73. Ordover & Willig, supra note 72, at 540.
74. See Statement Accompanying Release of Revised Merger Guidelines 1984 DOJ
Guidelines, supra note 16, § 1.
75. Although the 1982 DOJ Guidelines did not define the "price" for which
an increase would be postulated, the 1984 DOJ Guidelines specify "prevailing
prices." See Statement Accompanying Release of Revised Merger Guidelines 1984 DOJ
Guidelines, supra note 16, §§ 1, 2.11.
76. Harris &Jorde, supra note 61, at 483-84.
77. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
78. See D. GREENWALD, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 331 (1982). Cross
elasticity of demand "concerns the relation between the quantities bought of
one commodity as a function of the price of another. The demand for commod-
ity A is a function of the price of commodity B." Id.
79. For example, an increase in the price of lamb, when the price of pork
remains constant, will tend to increase the quantity of pork demanded. E. MANS-
FIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, 127 (5th ed. 1985).
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cross elasticity of demand among the several products only be-
cause the monopolist of-cellophane was following profit maximiz-
ing behavior, i.e., the monopolist may have raised the price of
cellophane until consumers were just willing to shift to substitute
products (e.g.s, wax paper, aluminum foil), which they would
have considered to be inferior to cellophane if all products were
priced at their respective marginal costs. Thus, cellophane and
its substitutes may have been more aptly described as related, but
contained in different economic submarkets. In order to assess
whether products exhibiting a high cross elasticity of demand are
substitutes, one would have to know the relationship between the
prevailing prices and marginal costs.8 0 However, if that informa-
tion were available, one would have enough information to mea-
sure market power directly and could dispense with the indirect
three step process of market definition, concentration level mea-
surement, and evaluation of other factors. Use of the DOJ's mar-
ket definition is even more impractical than the measurement of
cross elasticity in the Cellophane case because it requires infor-
mation concerning the measure of cross elasticity where a hypo-
thetical monopolist raised its price by a hypothetical amount.8 1
The hypothetical nature of the DOJ market definition results
in at least two other serious problems. First, since the DOJ mar-
ket definition considers all responses to a price increase likely to
occur within a year, it looks to the future and therefore requires
data that in most instances is not available. 2 (For example, it
would require data on the likely reaction of sellers located outside
the current selling area, who could divert supplies to the area but
who have not done so in the past and data on the likely reactions
of sellers capable of switching production to the relevant product
within one year but who have not made such a switch in the
past).83 Second, the hypothetical nature of the DOJ's market defi-
nition renders it extremely volatile, fluctuating according to as-
80. H. PETERSON, BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT 71 (2d ed. 1985).
81. Harris &Jorde, supra note 61, at 481.
82. Ordover & Willig, supra note 72, at 541.
83. When the DOJ revised its Guidelines in 1984, the period for determin-
ing whether production substitution by other firms is likely to occur in response
to a "small but significant and nontransitory" increase in price was changed
from six months to one year to conform with the time period used to identify
firms that are in the relevant geographic market.
"In determining whether any of these [demand and supply] responses are
probable, the department usually must rely on historical market information as
the best, and sometimes the only, indicator of how the market will function in
the future. It is important to note, however, that the Guidelines are fundamen-
tally concerned with probable future demand or supply responses." This state-
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sumptions of how firms outside of the provisional product and
geographic markets will respond to a small but significant and
nontransitory price increase.
The 1982 DOJ market definition employs Chicago School
style, ideal behavioral assumptions: "that buyers and sellers im-
mediately recognize the price increase and believe that it will be
sustained for the foreseeable future."'84 Such assumptions, which
ignore information imperfections, opportunistic and strategic be-
havior, and the risks involved in making a commitment to a sell-
ing effort based on a small price increase that may or may not be
transitory, in theory nearly always overstate the bounds of both
product and geographic markets in relation to the result in the
actual marketplace. Critics of the DOJ market definition have
often argued that the DOJ markets would be broader than the
economically relevant markets and would result in a systematic
understatement of market shares used in calculating market level
concentration. 85
In practice, since it is not always possible to control the as-
sumptions ofthose who are asked to speculate on likely response
of other firms to a small price increase, the DOJ markets may as
easily understate as overstate the economically relevant mar-
kets.8 6 Two recent merger cases, one in which the government
overstated a geographic market and the other in which it under-
stated the product market will illustrate this point.
The DOJ's market definition was held to be too broad in
United States v. Virginia National Bankshares, Inc.,87 a case that in-
volved a merger of two banking organizations located in a remote
mountainous county in southwestern Virginia. The DOJ alleged
that the two banks were horizontal competitors in the same geo-
graphic market despite the facts that the two areas were on oppo-
site sides of a mountain eight miles apart and were cut off from
each other in winter. The DOJ tried to prove its cases by offering
surveys in which bank customers were asked to state their likely
response to a five percent price rise.88 The court rejected the
ment is tantamount to an admission that the hypothetical market definition will
often be abandoned in practice. See 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, § 2.
84. See 1982 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 15, § IIA n.10.
85. Harris &Jorde, supra note 61, at 465; Schwartz, The New Merger Guide-
lines: Guide to Governmental Discretion and Private Counseling or Propaganda for Revi-
sion of The Antitrust Laws, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 575, 586-87 (1983).
86. Werden, Market Delineation and the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines,
1983 DUKE L.J. 514, 572-73.
87. 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,871, 72,351-53 (W.D. Va. 1982).
88. See Wertheimer, DOJ Tries Out its 5-Percent Geographic Market Test, Legal
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DOJ's survey and concluded that the two banks were in two sepa-
rate geographic markets; i.e., the DOJ market definition over-
stated the economically relevant market. In his oral opinion, the
district judge, sitting in Big Stone Gap, Virginia, castigated the
DOJ's economic expert on grounds that the survey results and his
testimony were so contradicted by the facts that he must either
have been ignorant or have taken the case purely for monetary
reward. 89
On the other hand, the DOJ's product market definition was
held to be too narrow in United States v. Calmar, Inc. ,90 a case which
involved a merger between two firms in the dispenser/sprayer in-
dustry. On the basis of surveys, in which those interviewed specu-
lated that they were unlikely to shift between "dispensers"
(mechanical pump devices that fit on the top of containers and
dispense liquid in the container by use of finger pressure on the
pump) and "sprayers" (similar mechanical pump devices that
emit a fine spray or droplets of liquid) in response to small but
significant and nontransitory increase in price, the DOJ alleged
that there were two separate product markets, sprayers and dis-
pensers. A district court rejected the DOJ's market definitions on
the ground that they were too narrow and concluded that the rel-
evant product market was the dispenser/sprayer market. 91 With
respect to the survey testimony, the court said:
Of necessity, the government's testimony was anecdotal
in nature-the observations of a few of the many hun-
dreds and perhaps many thousands of users of dispens-
ing devices. 921 The testimony reflected in part the
Times (Washington), Aug. 30, 1982 at 17, col. 1; see also Baker & Blumenthal,
supra note 7, at 347 n.146.
89. 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,871, 72,352 (W.D. Va. 1982).
90. 612 F. Supp. 1298 (D.N.J. 1985) (denying government's motion for
preliminary injunction against proposed acquisition).
91. Id. at 1304-05; see also United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S.
441 (1964) (Supreme Court held illegal merger between second largest manu-
facturer of metal containers with third largest manufacturer of glass containers).
The Supreme Court reversed a district court which had held that glass and metal
containers constituted separate lines of commerce. Id. at 457.
92. Cf Frank Salz & Sons, Inc. v. Hart Schaffner & Marx, 1985-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 66,768, 63,178 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (acquisition of financially troubled
competitor by men's "better quality" tailored suit manufacturer held not to be
in violation of section 7 of Clayton Act due to inadequate proof of market defini-
tion). The plaintiff was not able to demonstrate the necessary lack of demand-
or supply-side substitutability between better quality and other kinds (budget,
moderate, or best) of suits so as to show a distinct market. Id. at 63,719. The
only evidence supporting lack of reasonable interchangeability was the subjec-
tive and unsupported opinions of various sales and merchandising personnel, who testified
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inertia of any manufacturer to change its methods or
source of supply. It did not reflect the choice which
would be made by new users of dispensing devices enter-
ing the market for the first time, an event which must
occur with great frequency. 93
In effect, the court stated that the DOJ understated the product
market because its survey did not reflect the ideal market behav-
ioral assumptions underlying the DOJ Guidelines.
Finally, consider two cases: in one the court adopted the
market definitions in the DOJ Guidelines; in the other the defini-
tions were rejected. In Federal Trade Commission v. Occidental Petro-
leum Corp.,94 a district court expressed approval of the DOJ
Guidelines. 95 The court denied the FTC's preliminary injunction
to block a merger between firms which produce polyvinyl chloride
(PVC).96 In discussing the relevant geographic market the court
tracked the language of the DOJ Guidelines. "A geographic mar-
ket ... will be broader than the United States whenever a small
but significant and non-transitory price increase by all domestic
producers would be unprofitable because of sales lost to foreign
suppliers. '97 The court determined two relevant product mar-
from experience that people who bought expensive suits would not buy cheap
suits. Id. at 63,720 (emphasis added). Since price was the sole discriminating
characteristic by which to differentiate the markets, there was no way to analyze
whether an increase in price would affect demand for the suits. Id. Moreover,
there were manufacturers of lower quality suits who were capable of converting
to the better quality market. Id. In Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. v. The Limited,
Inc., a district court held that neither "moderate-priced women's fashion ap-
parel" nor "special-sized women's apparel" constitute a relevant product market
for section 7 purposes because there is no industry or expert agreement on the
meaning of these terms. 587 F. Supp. 246 (C.D. Cal. 1984). Moreover, the
court said that the proffered product market definition does not adequately ad-
dress two aspects of competition which must be considered when defining any
product market: demand and supply substitutability. Id. With respect to de-
mand substitutability, if specialty stores in a shopping mall raised their prices,
consumers could shop in a "panoply of other locations". Id. at 68,638. With
respect to supply substitutability, garment manufacturers could easily switch
production at little or no cost from size 7 to size 16 dresses. Id. at 68,638.
93. United States v. Calmar Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1298, 1304 (D.N.J. 1985).
94. 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,071 (D.D.C. 1986).
95. Id. "The . . .remedy of divestiture remains a possibility, but on this
record and the Department ofJustice Guidelines the Court expresses doubt that
the mere increase in concentration of domestic production will support such a
result." Id. at 62,509.
96. Id. at 62,512.
97. Id. at 62,512-13. "Without specifically defining a global market, the
Court has concluded that external production and capacity does influence the
domestic price structure, and may well become a more significant factor in the
immediate future." Id. at 62,509. The court said given that a five-year trend in
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kets: suspension PVC resins and dispersion PVC resins rather
than three as alleged by the FTC. The reason involves product
interchangeability on the demand side and the ability of produ-
cers of similar products to switch production in the event of
meaningful price increases. The court found substitution among
different PVC resins ("Suspension homopolymer and copolymer
resins are made with virtually the same equipment, with switch
over between the two requiring not much more than the turning
of a valve"), substitution between PVC resins and other plastic
resins, and substitution between PVC end products and end
products made from other materials. 98
The DOJ's market definition was useful in Occidental Petroleum
because it was one of the few real-world cases in which buyers had
considered the difference between a product and its next best
substitutes 99 to be very small even when the products were priced
at marginal cost: there is a high cross elasticity of demand even if
each of product is priced close to marginal cost. In short the DOJ
market definition was useful in this case because there was no cel-
lophane problem, i.e., no issue as to whether related products
were in the.same market or in different economic submarkets. As
an analysis of product and geographic market definitions in the
DOJ's own consent decrees demonstrates, commercially relevant
submarkets' 00  (e.g., vidicon tubes,10' drapery hardware, 10 2
etc.I ° 3) are as prevalent as broad textbook markets, 0 4 (e.g., na-
increased imports and a substantial excess production capacity domestically and
abroad would disrupt any attempt at collusion by domestic producers, a lessen-
ing of competition was highly unlikely. Id. at 62,512-13.
98. Id. "The boundaries of these markets, however, are not rigid due to the
substitution that does occur. In addition to substitution among the different
PVC resins, there is some substitution between PVC resins and other plastic
products made from other materials." Id. at 62,512.
99. In order to avoid the Cellophane problem discussed above, a next best
substitute is one in which there is a high cross elasticity of demand even when
both products are charging prices equal to marginal cost.
100. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-37 (1962) (rel-
evant geographic market within which to assess effects of acquisition must
" 'correspond to the commercial realities' of the industry and be economically
significant").
101. United States v. General Elec. Co., 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,382
(D.D.C. 1986).
102. United States v. Newell Cos., Inc. 1986-1 Trade Case. (CCH) 66,945
(D. Conn. 1985).
103. Many of the markets involved in the consent decrees are narrow; com-
mercially relevant submarkets as opposed to homogeneous product markets
where the difference between a product and next best substitute is small. Repre-
sentative examples of narrow markets in the consent decrees are as follows: vid-
icon tubes, milling paddy rice grown in California, gabions used in river control,
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tional markets for nylon 10 5 and beer'0 6). The markets in thirty
consent decrees entered into by the DOJ from 1981 to 1986 are
analyzed in Appendix 1.
Monfort of Colorado, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc. ,107 is a typical case in-
volving a commercially relevant submarket. In Cargill, both the
district court' 018 and the Tenth Circuit'0 9 unequivocally rejected
the DOJ Guidelines. The Tenth Circuit stated that:
[Defendant] would have preferred that the district court
use the current Justice Department Merger Guidelines,
• . . both to define relevant markets and to ascertain
whether the acquisition will substantially lessen competi-
tion. We agree with the district court's decision not to
rely on these Guidelines .... The Justice Department's
recent revisions of the 1982 market definition standards,
.. only strengthen our conviction that these guidelines
are more useful for setting prosecutorial policy than de-
lineating judicial standards."10
The district court, which determined the relevant input prod-
uct market to be grain fed cattle, rejected defendants' argument
that non-fed cattle are functionally and reasonably interchangea-
ble with fed cattle. The court held that the market should not
include slaughter facilities for non-fed cattle: first, only grain fed
drapery hardware used to hang drapes, air turbine starters, aviation lighting,
military specification computers, etc. Other consent decrees have broad product
markets but narrow geographic submarkets: e.g., nursing homes in 4 local geo-
graphic markets, beer in southeast U.S., dry-mix concrete products in the Wash-
ington-Baltimore and Philadelphia-New York City markets, waste collection in
20 localities, etc. See infra Appendices I and II.
104. "Perfect Competition Defined . . . Homogeneity of Product. The
product offered by any seller is identical to that supplied by any other seller....
Because the product is homogeneous, consumers do not care from which firm
they buy." W. J. BAUMOL & A.S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY,
468 (3rd ed. 1985).
105. See e.g., United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 1982-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,479 (D.D.C. 1981).
106. See e.g., United States v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 1983-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 65,399 (D. Del. 1983).
107. 591 F. Supp. 683 (D. Col. 1983), aff'd, 761 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1985),
reversed on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 484 (1986) (plaintiff did not have standing).
108. See 591 F. Supp. at 695-96. "We have considered the Merger Guide-
lines in the process of resolving this case. However, in determining whether the
planned acquisition will violate section 7 of the Clayton Act, the Court has relied
primarily on the judicial standards developed in judicial precedents arising
under section 7." Id. at 695-96.
109. 761 F.2d at 579.
110. Id. (citations omitted).
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cattle yield beef cuts with a consistent quality of USDA "good" or
better.I1 I Second, customers who purchase fed cattle are gener-
ally unwilling to buy from slaughterers who deal to any great ex-
tent in non-fed cattle. 1 2 Buyers who want better cuts of beef
have apparently determined that avoiding firms which have the
capability of substituting inferior products is more efficient than
engaging in costly inspections." 3 Third, non-fed slaughtering fa-
cilities generally lack both fabrication facilities" l 4 and important
economies of scale because they are smaller than facilities used to
slaughter fed cattle. 1 5 Fourth, fed and non-fed cattle slaughter-
ing facilities are located in different parts of the country and do
not compete because of the high transportation and shrinkage
costs from shipping carcasses long distances." 6 Fifth, the over-
whelming percentage of cattle slaughtered and fabricated by the
parties themselves was grain fed.'17 Sixth, defendants' internal
reports indicated their belief that fed cattle constitute a separate
product market." 8 With respect to the relevant output market,
the court determined that the relevant product market was vac-
uum-packed boxed beef. It rejected defendant's arguments for
broadening the output market to include all beef whether sold as
carcass," 19 ground, 20 or boxed beef. With respect to both input
and output product markets the district court said: "In order to
111. 591 F. Supp. at 697.
112. Id. at 698.
113. Whereas in Occidental Petroleum, the prospect of easy substitution in
production increased the likelihood that the relevant products were in the same
market, in Cargill, the prospect of easy substitution of an inferior product in
place of a superior product dictated that the products be sold in separate
markets.
114. " 'Fabrication' is the process whereby the [animal] carcass is broken
down into either whole cuts (referred to as 'primals,' 'subprimals' and 'por-
tions') or ground beef." 591 F. Supp. at 690.
115. Id. at 696, 698.
116. Id. at 699-700.
117. Id. at 697.
118. Id. at 698.
119. Id. at 702. Although the ultimate consumer is probably unable to dis-
tinguish between carcass beef and boxed beef, they are not functionally inter-
changeable to the retail store owners and the hotel and restaurant industry
buyers because of the reduced transportation cost, reduced labor cost and
longer shelf life of boxed beef over carcass beef. Carcass beef sales currently
account for only 16% of fed cattle slaughter. The market share of boxed beef
has risen from zero to 80% in the past 20 years and the trend will apparently
continue. Id.
120. Id. "Although ground beef and boxed beef are, in one sense, inter-
changeable as food stuffs, the two products are not functionally interchangeable
in several important respects." Id. The hotel and restaurant industry only uses
the better cuts of beef, i.e., boxed beef. Id. Boxed beef and ground beef are
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justify expanding a relevant product market due to interchangea-
bility of production facilities, it is necessary to focus on what man-
ufacturers actually do as opposed to what they could do." 12'
The NAAG Guidelines, on the other hand, define markets as
courts traditionally have, using hard evidence, that is, historical
data.' 22 Thus, where the DOJ market definition standard is hypo-
thetical, speculative and future oriented, 23 the NAAG market
definition is concrete, practical and past oriented. 24
In the NAAG Guidelines, the relevant product market in-
cludes each product produced in common by the merging firms,
plus comparably priced products that 75% of the customers of
the merged firms consider to be suitable substitutes. 25 The rele-
products of different production facilities. Id. Third, there are substantial price
differentials between boxed beef and ground beef. Id.
121. 591 F. Supp. at 697 (emphasis in original); see also FTC v. Coca-Cola
Co., 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,208 at 61,019-20 (D.D.C. 1986). The dis-
trict court, in discussing the relevant product market, said:
In view of the structure and operation of [the carbonated soft drink]
industry, the relevant line of commerce in evaluating the acquisition is
assuredly not what Coca-Cola Company suggests-"all ... beverages
including tap water"-even though it is true that other beverages
quench thirst and that "[t]he human stomach can consume only a finite
amount of liquid in any given period of time." The market or sub-
markets delineated need not be this broad (anything potable) nor as
unduly narrow (concentrate flavoring) as lawyers or economists may
choose to suggest.
Id.
122. United States v. Marine Bancorp, 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States
v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321 (1963).
123. In practice as opposed to theory, the differences between the DOJ and
NAAG Guidelines should not be overemphasized. The DOJ Guidelines state:
In determining whether any of these [supply and demand] responses
are probable, the department usually must rely on historical market in-
formation as the best, and sometimes the only, indicator of how the
market will function in the future. It is important to note, however, that
the Guidelines are fundamentally concerned with probable future de-
mand or supply responses .... In most cases, the Department's evalua-
tion of a merger will focus primarily on firms that currently produce
and sell the relevant product. In addition, the Department may include
other firms in the market if their inclusion would more accurately re-
flect probable supply responses.
See Market Definition and Measurement, 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, §§ 2,
*2.2.
124. Economic theory demonstrates that a firm's geographic market will be
discrete, its shape being a function of: (1) the firm's costs and prices, with lower
costs and prices meaning a larger territory for a firm; (2) the firm's transporta-
tion rates; discriminatively low rates that do not increase with the distance
shipped enlarge the territory of a firm. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 3;
Fetter, The Economic Law of Market Areas, 39 QUART. J. ECON. 520 (1924).
125. The NAAG Guidelines state that markets are defined from the per-
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vant geographic market area encompasses the production loca-
tions from which the customers of the merging parties purchase
75% of their supplies of the relevant product. 126 The 75% figure
is, of course, just as arbitrary as the DOJ's hypothetical 5% price
increase which it used in the 1982 Guidelines. By leaving out as
many as 25% of the suppliers of the merged firm's customers, the
75% figure may understate economically relevant markets and
should be construed flexibly when cases warrant. 127 It is a text-
book proposition that demand is more elastic in the long run than
in the short run. 128 That is to say, markets tend to contain more
substitutes in the future. Since the NAAG Guidelines look to the
past to inform market definition, their determination is biased to-
ward a narrower market definition then what may actually be the
economically relevant market. In contrast, the DOJ market defini-
tion is biased toward markets broader than the economically rele-
vant ones.' 29 Although the general bias of the NAAG Guidelines
may be to understate markets, it may in fact overstate markets in
cases where the merging firms have market power. If the price
charged by the merging firms is substantially above production
costs, other firms may find it profitable to incur sizable transpor-
tation costs in order to ship products into this market. 130 In that
case, geographic markets would be overstated, causing market
share to be understated, with the result that such mergers would
be less likely to be challenged.
spective of those interests § 7 of the Clayton Act was primarily enacted to pro-
tect, i.e., the classes of consumers or (suppliers) who may be adversely affected
by an anticompetitive merger ("the protected interest group"). See NAAG
Guidelines, supra note 2, § 3; Harris &Jorde, supra note 61, at 18-20.
126. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, §§ 3.1-3.22. The NAAG geo-
graphic market definition is reminiscent of that proposed by Elzinga and
Hogarty. See Elzinga & Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation Revis-
ited: The Case of Coal, 23 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1978); Elzinga & Hogarty, The Prob-
lem of Geographic Market Delineation Antimerger Suits, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 45, 72-76
(1973) [hereinafter Elzinga & Hogarty, Market Delineation].
127. Elzinga & Hogarty, Market Delineation, supra note 126, at 74-75.
128. W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, supra note 104, at 386.
129. In United States v. General Dynamics Corp., the DOJ charged that the ac-
quisition of a firm by General Dynamics would violate section 7 of the Clayton
Act because the latter's share of the relevant market in coal production would be
10.9% after the merger and the concentration ratios of the leading firms would
also increase. 415 U.S. 486, 499-504 (1974). The Supreme Court held, how-
ever, that the district court was justified in finding this evidence to be insufficient
to sustain the Government's case, because the acquired firm's coal was tied up in
long term requirements contracts and the company had very limited coal
reserves. Id. In light of the lack of reserves, the Court thought that past produc-
tion and sales figures overrated the mergered firm's future market power. Id.
130. H. PETERSON, supra note 80, at 73-74.
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The NAAG Guidelines would also admit evidence on product
and geographic submarkets.' 3' This provision is supported by
leading merger cases, which hold that the main criteria for defin-
ing a product or submarket are distinctive end uses, independent
pricing, and customer recognition. Recent cases are in accord. In
Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., the Sixth Circuit held that there
were many geographic markets and submarkets for gasoline in
the United States. 13 2 The district court for the Northern District
of California in United States v. Acorn Engineering Co., held that the
relevant submarket included only vandal-resistant plumbing fix-
tures not plumbing fixtures in general. 133 Again, the district
court for the Northern District of Illinois in Whithaker Corp. v. Ed-
gar, defined the relevant market to be motor-operated aircraft
valves as opposed to the broader market of remote operated air-
craft valves (including motor, pneumatic, hydraulic, solenoid, and
manually operated valves). 134
In order to avoid the Cellophane problem discussed above,
the NAAG Guidelines consider only comparably priced prod-
131. "Evidence of the commercial reality of such a submarket includes
price discrimination, inelasticity of demand and industry of public recognition of
a distinct submarket." See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 3.11. In Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, the United States Supreme Court said that when defining
submarkets, courts should rely on "such practical indicia as industry or public
recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the product's pecu-
liar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers, dis-
tinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors." 370 U.S. 294,
325 (1962).
132. 530 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982). "It seems clear that there are many geographical
markets and submarkets for motor gasoline in the country. The District Court
did not err in analyzing concentration ratios in defining relevant markets by
state rather than limiting its consideration to the nation as a whole." 669 F.2d at
380.
133. 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,197 (N.D. Cal. 1981). The govern-
ment's position as to the existence of a relevant market encompassing only van-
dal-resistant plumbing fixtures prevailed because: (1) the fixtures had peculiar
characteristics and uses designed for distinct customers (use of the fixtures in
jails where there is a high risk of vandalism); (2) the submarket for vandal-resis-
tant fixtures was recognized as a separate economic entity within the industry;
and (3) vandal-resistant fixture pricing and price sensitivity were distinct from
those of other plumbing fixtures. Id. at 73,712.
134. 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill. 1982). As an example of an extremely spe-
cialized submarket in a section 7 Clayton Act case, consider Grumman Corp. v.
LTV Corp., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,364 (2d Cir. 1981). In Grumman
Corp., the court stated that "[a]s both sides point out, the carrier-based aircraft
market has unusual characteristics. In this country there is only one buyer, the
Defense Department. It decides which companies will be invited to submit bids
for new planes. Bidding competitions occur infrequently and entail enormous
costs." Id. at 74,679.
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ucts.135 However, by so attempting to avoid this problem, and
also the problem of intractable cross elasticity disputes, the
NAAG market definitions run the risk of excluding genuine sub-
stitutes that are not comparably priced. For example, consumers
may choose a lower-priced product because the additional bene-
fits of the "deluxe" model are "not worth" the higher price. If,
however, the price differential between the "standard" and
deluxe models narrows, at least some consumers may decide that
the extra features of the deluxe model are worth the higher price.
Thus, in order to avoid the Cellophane problem, the NAAG mar-
ket definition runs the risk of defining markets too narrowly. Nev-
ertheless, the NAAG's rough, but practical, approach to the
Cellophane problem is preferable to the DOJ's theoretical ap-
proach which necessitates speculation concerning a number of
imponderables. 13 6
Unlike the DOJ Guidelines, which include potential competi-
tors (firms that have not yet supplied the market) as part of the
market definition, the NAAG Guidelines take a very restrictive
view of such competitors in its market definition. Before includ-
ing competition which is likely to occur within one year of the
merger in the relevant market, the NAAG Guidelines require hard
evidence of probable supply response, the most persuasive proof
of which will be a prior history of supplying the market under
similar circumstances. Thus, for market definition purposes, to
be recognized as potential competition, the potential competitors
must have provided actual competition in the past. This method,
which is tantamount to ignoring potential competition when de-
fining markets, is the one courts have traditionally used. As the
Second Circuit said in United States v. Waste Management, Inc.,
"Although potential competition resulting from easy entry can as
logically be appraised as part of market definition . . . we will
utilize the traditional analysis of defining the market in terms of
existing competitors." 3 7
135. In FTC v. PPG Industries, Inc., the district court held that in addition to
being functionally interchangeable, glass and acrylic transparencies frequently
compete for contracts to supply airframe manufacturers and, therefore, are in
the same market. 628 F. Supp. 881 (D.D.C. 1986).
136. A persistent dilemma of antitrust is that simple rules are proclaimed to
be irrational, whereas rational complex rules are criticized for want of simplicity.
Kauper, The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Of Collusion, Efficiency, and Failure,
71 CALIF. L. REV. 497, 500 (1983).
137. 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). For a discussion of
Waste Management, see infra notes 194-201 and accompanying text. In Tenneco,
Inc. v. FTC, an FTC conclusion that the acquisition of the second largest manu-
facturer of replacement shock absorbers by a diversified firm that manufactured
306 [Vol. 33: p. 281
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With respect to foreign competition, the 1982 DOJ Guide-
lines stated that the DOJ would be "somewhat more cautious,
both in expanding market boundaries beyond the United States
and in assessing the likely supply response of specific foreign
firms ... [which] may be subject to additional constraints not
present in the purely domestic context."' 138 However, in its 1984
Guidelines, the DOJ stated that "[t]oday's revisions clarify that, in
general, the Guidelines' standards relating to the definition of
markets and the calculation of market shares will apply equally to
foreign and domestic firms. 139 This change, like all other revi-
automotive parts and exhaust systems eliminated actual potential competition in
a highly concentrated market for replacement shock absorbers was not sup-
ported by substantial evidence that the acquiring firm had viable options to
make a toehold acquisition or was likely to enter the market de novo in the near
future and was reversed. 689 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1982). The point was made in a
strong dissenting opinion that existing shock absorber manufacturers were
aware that the acquiring firm had publicly demonstrated a strong and growing
interest in entering the industry, that circumstantial evidence is the lifeblood of
antitrust law, that the FTC is not required, as the majority demanded, to intro-
duce "smoking gun" evidence, and that in determining whether the FTC's find-
ings are supported by substantial evidence the court may not substitute its
inferences for those drawn by the FTC, provided its findings are rationally
based. Id. at 358-64 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). In Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. v.
Waste Management, Inc., a corporate takeover target was denied a preliminary in-
junction against a tender offer for its shares because of an inadequate showing of
likelihood of success on the merits of its section 7, Clayton Act claims. 1982-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,860 (W.D. Wash. 1982). Actual competition between
the firm and its takeover target in an eight-state regional market for hazardous
waste management services appeared improbable in view of transportation
costs. In addition, the firm was not perceived by industry members as a poten-
tial entrant.
In Republic of Texas Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, a
bank-merger application that had been denied was returned to the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System for more detailed findings as to
whether the acquiring bank holding company and the to-be acquired commer-
cial bank were actual potential competitors whose combination might violate the
section 7 of the Clayton Act standard incorporated in section 3 of the Bank
Holding Company Act. 649 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1981). Although the Board had
made adequate findings as to the oligopolistic character of the relevant banking
market, it failed to identify explicitly other potential entrants in the market, to
offer a persuasive rationale demonstrating that the acquiring bank holding com-
pany would probably have entered the market independently, or to make a re-
viewable finding on whether the holding company's independent entry would
have resulted in a substantial likelihood of ultimately producing deconcentration
or other significant procompetitive effects. Id. at 1044-47.
138. "For example, changes in exchange rates, tariffs, and general political
conditions may limit the ability of such firms to respond to domestic price in-
creases." 1982 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 15, § IIC.
139. The Guidelines also stated that "no foreign firm will be excluded from
the market solely because its sales in the United States are subject to import
quotas." See Statement Accompanying Release of Revised Merger Guidelines, 1984 DOJ
Guidelines, supra note 16, § 3; see also FTC v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 1986-
1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,071 (D.D.C. 1986). "Without specifically defining a
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sions in the DOJ Guidelines, resulted in a more lenient attitude
by the DOJ towards horizontal mergers. 40 Although the first half
of the 1980's witnessed great foreign penetration into American
markets, the rapid decline of the dollar and the growth of protec-
tionist sentiment make it likely that the 1984 Guidelines' equal
treatment of foreign and domestic competition is too lenient and
may already be outdated:
In the NAAG Guidelines, foreign firms presently supplying
the relevant market are assigned market shares in the same man-
ner as domestic firms, according to their actual current sales in
the relevant market. However, the NAAG Guidelines go on to say
that due to tariffs, quotas, fluctuation in exchange rates, and vol-
untary quantitative restrictions, foreign firms are inherently a less
reliable check on market power than domestic firms; therefore,
when such restrictions exist, the NAAG Guidelines call for a re-
duction of market shares based upon historical sales data.' 4 ' The
NAAG Guidelines approach is probably more consonant with cur-
rent international political reality.
VI. CONCENTRATION STANDARDS
In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,142 the Supreme
Court held that large market shares and high concentration levels
global market, the Court has concluded that external production and capacity
does influence the domestic price structure, and may well become a more signifi-
cant factor in the immediate future." Occidental, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH), at
62,509. The court said given that a five-year trend in increased imports and a
substantial excess production capacity domestically and abroad would disrupt
any attempt at collusion by domestic producers, a lessening of competition was
highly unlikely. Id. at 62,512-13.
140. The 1984 DOJ Guidelines increased the number of defenses and other
factors that may reduce the significance of concentration levels from 10 to 14;
added a failing division to the failing firm defense; added an efficiency defense,
whereas the 1982 Guidelines indicated that the DOJ would consider efficiency
claims only in "extraordinary cases." In 1984, the Guidelines changed the "five-
percent market definition test to a flexible standard," defined the price for which
an increase would be postulated in the market definition standard as the prevail-
ing price (even if such price is above marginal cost), changed the Post-Merger
HHI below 1000 standard from "the Department is unlikely to challenge merg-
ers in this region" to "the Department will not challenge mergers falling in this
region," changed from a "cautious" approach to applying market definition
standards to foreign competitions to one of applying market definition stan-
dards equally to both foreign and domestic firms. Statement Accompanying Release
of Revised Merger Guidelines, 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, § 3.
141. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 3.41.
142. 374 U.S. 321 (1963) "[W]e think that a merger which produces a firm
controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a
significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently
likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence
308 (Vol. 33: p. 281
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will establish a prima facie case of an antitrust violation. Accord-
ingly, unless there are other factors that reduce the significance of
market share and concentration levels, disturbing concentration
levels will lead to the conclusion that a proposed merger is an-
ticompetitive. The DOJ Guidelines employ the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) as its measure of market concentra-
tion. 143 The HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the
individual market shares of all firms in the market. For example,
for a market consisting of five firms with shares of 30, 20, 20, 15,
and 15% each, the HHI is 2150 (302 + 202 + 202 + 152 + 152 =
2150). For the same market, the traditional four-firm concentra-
tion ratio, CR4, which is the sum of the market shares of the top
four firms in the market, is 85% (30% + 20% + 20% + 15% =
85%). Unlike the CR4 traditionally used by the courts, the HHI
takes into account both the relative size of firms in a market (giv-
ing proportionately greater weight to the market shares of larger
firms) and the total number of firms in a market. It approaches
zero when a market is served by a large number of firms of rela-
tively equal size, and reaches its maximum of 10,000 when a sin-
gle supplier exists in the market. The HHI increases both as the
number of firms in the market decreases and as the disparity in
size among those firms increases. 144 Although there has been
considerable discussion as to whether the HHI is superior to the
CR4, 14 5 the correlation between the two measures is very high;
one study has arrived at a correlation coefficient of 0.936.146
The DOJ arbitrarily chose critical HHI thresholds of 1000
and 1800; 14 7 these thresholds correspond roughly to CR4s of
of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompe-
titive effects." Id. at 363 (citation omitted).
143. For a discussion of the paternity of the HHI index, see Fox, The New
Merger Guidelines-A Blueprint for Microeconomic Analysis, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 519,
569 (1982).
144. The premise of the HHI is the quality of performance increases as
equality of size of sellers increases. Id. at 571; see also Adelman, Comment on the
'H' Concentration Measure as a Numbers Equivalent, 51 REV. EcON. & STAT. 99
(1969).
145. E. SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 136-55 (1968); Calkins, The New
Merger Guidelines and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 402 (1983);
Dansby & Willig, Industry Performance Gradient Indexes, 69 AMER. ECON. REV. 249
(1979); Ordover, Sykes & Willig, Herfindahl Concentration, Rivalry, and Mergers, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1857 (1982); Schmalensee, Using the H-Index of Concentration With
Published Data, 5 REV. ECON. & STAT. 186 (1977).
146. F. SCHERER, supra note 70, at 58.
147. Calkins, supra note 145, at 417 & n.1 10 (William Baxter who was Assis-
tant Attorney General for Antitrust Division when the 1982 DOJ Guidelines
were issued admits the thresholds are arbitrary).
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50% and 70% respectively.' 48 The thresholds divide the spec-
trum of market concentration into three regions which the DOJ
characterizes as unconcentrated (HHI below 1000), moderately
concentrated (HHI between 1000 and 1800) and highly concen-
trated (HHI above 1800). the DOJ Guidelines are as follows:
post-merger HHI below 1000
the DOJ will not challenge a merger 149
post-merger HHI between 1000 and 1800
a) the DOJ is unlikely to challenge a merger that in-
creases HHI less than 100 points
b) the DOJ is more likely than not to challenge a
merger that increases HHI more than 100 points150
post-merger HHI above 1800
a) the DOJ is unlikely to challenge a merger that in-
creases HHI less than 50 points
b) the DOJ may challenge mergers that increases HHI
between 50 and 100 points depending on other factors
(discussed below), 15 1
148. Those are rough average figures. The CR4 cannot be converted into
any single HHI but rather includes a possible range of HHI levels. For example,
consider two markets with CR4 of 100%. The first is comprised of four firms,
each with a market share of 25%. This yields an HHI of 2500 (252 + 252 + 252
+ 252 = 2500). The second market is comprised of four firms with market
shares of 70%, 10%, 10% and 10%. This yeilds an HHI of 5200 (702 + 102 +
102 + 102 = 5200). One thousand corresponds to a minimum CR4 of 33.5%
and a maximum CR4 of 62%; 1800 corresponds to a minimum CR4 of 44.7%
and a maximum CR4 of 84.5%. Weinstock, Some Little-Known Properties of the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: Problems of Translation and Specification, 29 ANTITRUST
BULL. 705 (1984).
149. See 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, § 3.11(a). This is a change
from the 1982 Guidelines which stated that the DOJ "is unlikely to challenge
mergers in this region", i.e., HHI below 1000. See 1982 DOJ Guidelines, supra
note 15, § IIIA(l)(a).
150. The increase in concentration as measured by the HHI can be calcu-
lated independently of the overall market concentration by doubling the product
of the market shares of the merging firms. For example, the merger of firms
with shares of 5% and 10% of the market would increase the HHI by 100 (5 x 10
x 2 = 100). The explanation for this technique is as follows: In calculating the
HHI before the merger, the market shares of the merging firms are squared
individually. Thus: (a) 2 + (b)2 . After the merger, the sum of those shares
would be squared. Thus: (a + b)2 , which equals aq + 2ab + b 2. The increase in
the HHI therefore is represented by 2ab. See 1982 DOJ Guidelines, supra note
15, § IIIA.1 n.30.
151. In the 1982 Guidelines, the DOJ said that if post-merger HHI is above
1800 and the merger produces increases in HHI between 50 and 100 points, it
would base its decision on a list of other factors. In the 1984 Guidelines, the
DOJ said that it would be likely to challenge such mergers, "unless" its list of
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c) the DOJ will challenge a merger that increases HHI
more than 100 points except in "extraordinary cases" in
which other factors establish that the merger is not likely
substantially to lessen competition.1 52
The DOJ Guidelines also contain a "leading firm proviso" to
the effect that a merger between a firm, which has a market share
of at least 35% and is twice as large as the second largest firm in
the market, and a firm with at least a 1% market share is likely to
be challenged. However, the 1984 DOJ Guidelines state that
"market share and concentration data provide only the starting
point for analyzing the competitive impact of a merger. Before
determining to challenge a merger, the Department will consider
all other relevant factors that pertain to its competitive
impact." 153
In practice, the DOJ has not challenged mergers that are
within the HHI 1000-1800 range. As of March, 1987, not one
enforcement action has been instituted against a merger within
the HHI 1000-1800 range in the past seven years.' 54 Given this
permissive approach of the DOJ, former Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral for Antitrust, Sanford Litvak, has described his approach to
counseling clients in merger cases by saying, "there is virtually
nothing not worth trying." 5 5 Another former Assistant Attorney
General for Antitrust, J. Paul McGrath, has suggested that given
the reluctance to challenge mergers especially where ease of entry
or efficiency defenses are present, the DOJ should consider rais-
ing the threshold challenge to 1800 or 2000.156
The HHI and concentration ratios of the 30 consent decrees
other factors convinced it that the merger would not be likely substantially to
lessen competition. See 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, § 3.11 (c). The dif-
ferent formulations in the 1982 and 1984 Guidelines are to the same effect.
152. See id. § 3.11.
153. See id.
154. 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1308, at 605 (March 26,
1987). For example, the General Motors-Toyota joint venture in the subcom-
pact automobile market would increase the HHI from 1293 to 1773, an increase
of 480 points. Weinstock, supra note 148, at 711.
155. 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1245, at 1056 (Dec. 19,
1985).
156. Id. at 1056. In FTC v. Coca-Cola Co., the largest carbonated soft drink
company in the United States attempted to acquire the fourth largest, a merger
that surely no one would have thought worth trying previous to 1980. 1986-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,208 (D.D.C. 1985). In this case, a district court granted
a preliminary injunction against the merger on a showing that the defendant
would enjoy a 42% post-merger share of the market, a 4.2% addition. Id. In the
South and South Western United States, its post-merger share would be over 50%.
Id. The CR4 would was 76.6 and the HHI would increase from 2306 to 2390
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that are analyzed in Appendix I bear out these statements: of the
12 consent decrees for which HHI figures are given in competi-
tive impact statements,1 57 all have at least one relevant market in
which the HHI is substantially above 1800; of the 17 consent de-
crees, for which concentration ratios are given (but not HHI), all
but one are correspondingly high, having CR4s exceeding 70%.
In one consent decree the competitive impact statement gives
neither HHI nor concentration ratios. The consent decrees also
reflect the DOJ's "fix it first" or curative divestitures approach to
mergers.15 8 Under this approach, rather than limiting its alterna-
tives to either challenging or not challenging a merger, the DOJ is
willing to discuss partial divestitures that would make a merger
acceptable. There are suggestions in at least two cases that the
curative divestiture approach to mergers may be subject to abuse
due to the possibility of sham divestitures. !5 9
An investigation of consent decrees from 1981-1986 sup-
ports the following generalizations: four consent decrees involve
(concentration figures calculated from table 1986-2 Trade Cas. at 61,020). Id. at
61,020.
157. "Simultaneously with the filing ... [of any proposal for a consent
judgment submitted by the United States under the antitrust laws], unless other-
wise instructed by the court, the United States shall file with the district court,
publish in the Federal Register, and thereafter furnish to any person upon re-
quest, a competitive impact statement. . .. ." 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1982).
158. N.Y. Times, Sept., 16, 1986, § IV, at 2, col. 1.
159. National Union Elec. Corp. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 1981-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 64,274 (N.D. Il. 1981). The merger of two competitors in the highly
concentrated chain saw market, was not challenged by the government on condi-
tion that one of the merging firms-also a manufacturer of other lines of power
tools-sell, its chain saw business to a third party. Id. at 74,197. The merged
companies' subsequent decision to begin marketing chain saws through the
power tool distribution system, could be viewed as a possibly unlawful horizon-
tal merger only if the sale of the chain saw assets had been a sham transaction.
Id. at 74,198. A third party's charges under section 7 of the Clayton Act were
not dismissed, but a preliminary injunction was denied. Id.
White Consolidated Industries, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., involved two stock
purchases under which a dishwasher manufacturer would 1) acquire a competi-
tor's dishwasher marketing (including brand names) and manufacturing subsidi-
aries, and 2) as a curative divestiture would (a) sell the manufacturing subsidiary
to a dishwashing marketer and (b) agree to be supplied from the manufacturing
subsidiary it transfered. 612 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D. Ohio), vacated, 619 F. Supp.
1022 (N.D. Ohio 1985), aft'd, 781 F.2d 1224 (6th Cir. 1986). The HHI made a
prima facie case (HHI for dishwashers ranging from 1,599 to 2,572 and post-
transaction HHIs ranging from 1,844 to 3,832). However, over plaintiff's objec-
tions that the supply contract placed the dishwashing marketer to whom the
manufacturing subsidiary was transferred in the position of a subcontractor for
the merged firm, a district court allowed the merger after the parties to the sup-
ply contract agreed to an amendment of the contract so as to allow the marketer-
manufacturer to control its own production and to become an independent
force in the market.
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regional or national firms that competed in many local markets
(nursing homes, 160 banks, 16 1 waste collection services, 162 and tex-
tile rental services' 63). The DOJ ended its challenge to these
mergers when the firms consented to a divestiture of plants in
localities where the merger would result in HHIs substantially in
excess of 1800. One can assume that because of inherent mul-
tiplant economies of scale, 16 4 the DOJ did not demand total di-
vestiture in these local market extensions. Two consent decrees
involved national brewers which wanted to strengthen their posi-
tion in regional markets; these mergers were allowed subject to
divestiture in regions where the HHI would substantially exceed
1800.165 Two consent decrees involved large diversified firms
that when combined would have had a near monopoly in a single
product line which each firm produced. 166 In each case, the
merger was not challenged subject to divestiture of that product
line by one of the diversified firms. The 1981-1986 consent de-
crees of the DOJ are analyzed in Appendix II.
The natural question to ask is, why has the DOJ enforcement
policy apparently been at odds with the stated thresholds in its
own Guidelines? The answer may be found in the inconsistent
methodology or schizophrenic nature of the DOJ Guidelines. On
the one hand, the DOJ's market definition standards show the in-
fluence of the Chicago School: the market definition is theoreti-
cally ideal, but in practice, unworkable. 167 On the other hand, the
HHI thresholds that divide the spectrum of market concentration
into three regions show the influence of the "Harvard School": 168
the HHI thresholds are theoretically arbitrary, but definite and
160. United States v. Beverly Enter., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,052
(M.D. Ga. 1984).
161. United States v. National Bank and Trust Co. of Norwich, 1984-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,074 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
162. United States v. Waste Management Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (D.D.C. 1985).
163. United States v. ARA Servs., Inc., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,209
(S.D. Ohio 1982).
164. D. DEWEY, THE THEORY OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION: A RADICAL RE-
CONSTRUCTION 42-59 (1969).
165. United States v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 1983-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 65,399 (D. Del. 1983); United States v. The Stroh Brewery Co., 1982-
83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,037 (D.D.C. 1982).
166. United States v. General Elec. Co., 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,382(D.D.C. 1986); United States v. Allied Corp., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 66,867
(D.D.C. 1985).
167. The DOJ product and geographic market definition was published a
year after and seems to have been influenced by Landes & Posner, supra note 70.
Landes and Judge Posner are two leading Chicago School authors.
168. Posner, supra note 8.
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practical. The tripartite division of the DOJ Guidelines is remi-
niscent of the tripartite characterization of the spectrum of mar-
ket concentration suggested by two Harvard School authors, Carl
Kaysen and Donald Turner, albeit with significantly lower thresh-
olds. They characterized industries as either unconcentrated
(CR8 below 33%), Type II [or loose] Oligopoly (CR8 between 33
and 50%), or Type I [tight] Oligopoly (CR8 above 50%, CR20 =
75%). 169
In general, the characterization of the spectrum of market
concentration by a tripartite division is an acceptance of the
Harvard School's structure-conduct-performance paradigm,i70
which states that there is a "causal flow from market structure...
to conduct and performance."' 17' That is, increasing concentra-
tion causes noncompetitive conduct and results in poor perform-
ance and/or allocative inefficiency. Chicago School authors reject
this paradigm as well as the possibility of determining practical
thresholds. 72 For example, consider the testimony of Professor
George Stigler of the University of Chicago in Marathon Oil Co. v.
Mobil Corp.,173 concerning the interpretation of the most impor-
tant element in market structure, the concentration ratio: "what
level do we worry about? And I must say that we have no precise
point which is a critical point at which you must worry." 174 The
affinity of the Reagan Administration's DOJ for the Chicago
School's antitrust analysis, much of which denigrates the very par-
adigm on which the concentration thresholds are based, is one
factor that tends to explain why the DOJ has apparently not fol-
169. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 27 (1959).
170. The elements of market structure are: number of sellers and buyers,
product differentiation, barriers to entry, cost structures, vertical integration,
and conglomerateness; the elements of conduct are: pricing behavior, product
strategy and advertising, research and innovation, plant investment, and legal
tactics; the elements of performance are: production and allocative efficiency,
progress, full employment, and equity. J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 36-
38, 295-301, 310-15 (1968); F. SCHERER, supra note 70, at 3-6; Mason, The Cur-
rent Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1265
(1949).
171. F. SCHERER, supra note 70, at 5.
172. INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING ch. 4 (H.
Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston, eds., 1974) [hereinafter INDUSTRIAL CON-
CENTRATION]; Brozen, The Antitrust Task Force Deconcentration Recommendation, 23 J.
LAw & ECON. 279 (1970); Kauper, supra note 136, at 506 (Since Chicago School
authors argue that there is no correlation between concentration and perform-
ance, it follows they would argue that the 1982 Guidelines rest on same faulty
premises.); Paulter, supra note 32, at 605-49.
173. 530 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982).
174. 669 F.2d at 381.
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lowed its own concentration Guidelines. Another factor may be
some recent and controversial scholarship to the effect that three
large firms may be sufficient for an industry to behave competi-
tively.' 75 In a footnote to its 1982 Guidelines the DOJ acknowl-
edged this scholarship but said it was not presently prepared to
act on it:
There is some economic evidence that, where one or two
firms dominate a market, the creation of a strong third
firm enhances competition. The Department has consid-
ered this evidence but is not presently prepared to bal-
ance this possible gain against the certainty or
substantially increased concentration in the market.176
The DOJ's recent actions indicate that it may now be acting on
this evidence.
The NAAG Guidelines closely track the DOJ Guidelines,
adopting both the HHI measure of concentration and the DOJ's
thresholds of 1000 and 1800. An action to challenge a merger is
likely in the HHI 1000-1800 range for increases of more than 100
points, and is likely when HHI is above 1800 for increases of
more than 50 points. 177 An innovation in the NAAG Guidelines
is an attempt "to objectively factor in the dynamic conditions in
an industry." 78 An action to challenge a merger is likely if the
post-merger HHI is between 1000 and 1800 (above 1800), the
merger increases the HHI by more than 50(25) points, and dur-
ing the 35 months prior to the proposed merger the HHI has in-
creased by more than 100(50) points. The NAAG Guidelines
contain a leading firm proviso similar to that in the DOJ's Guide-
lines. There is also a provision that a merger between a firm with
a market share of 20% or more and a new, innovative firm in a
market with a moderate to high or very high concentration will be
challenged. The NAAG Guidelines also state that notwithstand-
ing the HHI thresholds, a merger will not be challenged if other
factors concerning ease of entry, history of collusive or oligopolis-
175. Kwoka, The Effects of Market Share Distribution on Industry Performance, 61
REV. ECON. & STAT. 101 (1979); Kwoka & Ravenscraft, Collusion, Rivalry, Scale
Economies, and Line of Business Profitability (Washington, D.C.: FTC, Bureau of Ec-
onomics, 1982); Paulter, supra note 32, at 642-49.
176. See 1982 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 15, § IIIA.l.(c) n.33.
177. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, §§ 4.2-4.3.
178. See id., § 4.1. Support for this provision is found in the Supreme
Court's opinion in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, in which it said "[w]e cannot
avoid the mandate of Congress that tendencies toward concentration in industry
are to be curbed in their incipiency." 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1964).
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tic behavior, or efficiencies "compel the conclusion that the
merger is not likely substantially to lessen competition."', 79
Given the policy statement in the NAAG Guidelines, one can
assume that the drafters of the NAAG Guidelines intend that the
state attorneys general will initiate enforcement actions in the
moderately concentrated region (HHI between 1000 and
1800);180 as pointed out above, the DOJ has not initiated actions
in this range. The Sixth Circuit's opinion in Marathon Oil Co. v.
Mobil Corp.,' 81 in 1981, is an example of an opinion that is closer
in spirit to the NAAG than to the DOJ Guidelines. The court up-
held a temporary injunction against a merger of two oil compa-
nies because it said that the merger would result in concentration
ratios in relevant markets and submarkets from 10% to 20%,
within the range believed to confer market power and other an-
ticompetitive behavior.
Thus far, the few attempts by state and local governments to
enforce the antitrust laws have met with mixed results. In City of
Pittsburg v. May Department Stores Co. 182 a city, county, and state
brought charges under section 7 of the Clayton Act against the
proposed merger of the area's two dominant department store
chains. In a settlement, the chains were permitted to merge on
condition that one store divest a division within two years. On
the other hand, in State of California v. Texaco, Inc. ,183 an FTC con-
sent order settling charges that the merger of oil companies vio-
lated section 7 was held to preempt a challenge to the merger by
the State of California under its antitrust and unfair competition
statutes.
VII. FACTORS AFFECTING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MARKET SHARE
AND CONCENTRATION
In United States v. General Dynamics Corp.,i84 the Supreme
Court said: "statistics concerning market share and concentra-
tion, while of great significance, [are] not conclusive indicators of
anticompetitive effects." Other factors may either reduce 85 or
179. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 4.3.
180. Cf United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 462 (1964) (it
is important to prevent "even slight increases in concentration").
181. 530 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ohio), aft'd, 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982).
182. 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,304 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
183. 193 Cal. App. 3d 8, 219 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1985).
184. 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974).
185. In Stroh Brewery Co. v. Malmgren, a district court declined to prelimina-
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strengthen 8 6 the significance of market share and concentration
levels. The DOJ and NAAG Guidelines take opposite approaches
with respect to other factors that affect the significance of market
share and concentration levels. The DOJ Guidelines take a flexi-
ble approach and consider a potpouri of other factors in addition
to the HHI and the size of its increase:' 8 7 e.g., ease of entry within
rily enjoin a merger between the third and seventh largest brewers in the United
States (with 7.9% and 5% of the United States market, respectively) on the
grounds that although the acquired company had made a prima facie showing
through statistical data that its acquisition by a competitor would violate section
7 of the Clayton Act by increasing market concentration, it was rebutted by
other factors which showed that competition would not be lessened by the pro-
posed merger and may in fact be increased. 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,670,
73,641 (W.D. Wis. 1982). Factors considered by the court included geographic
sales patterns, different brands and grades of beer, excess plant capacity, eco-
nomics of scale, national advertising and product differentiation, the inability to
fix prices, and industry structure and history. Id. at 73,643. This merger was
also involved in a consent decree. See United States v. Stroh Brewery Co., 1982-
83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,037 (D.D.C. 1982). See infra Appendices I & II.
186. FTC v. Bass Bros. Enterprises, Inc., is an example of a merger case in
which other factors strengthened rather than reduced the significance of high
concentration levels and high HHI. 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 66,041 (N.D.
Ohio 1984). The FTC attacked two mergers in the carbon black industry. The
two mergers would have reduced the number of firms in the industry from 7 to
5; the CR4 would increase from 75% to 89%, the HHI would increase from
1802 to 2320 or 518 points. Each merger alone would have increased the HHI
by 200-300 points. Id. at 66,610. Carbon black is used in reinforcement to give
rubber strength and durability. It is a unique substance for which there are no
practical substitutes. Carbon black is a homogeneous, fungible product (thus,
consensus on a coordinated price structure is easy to achieve). It requires spe-
cialized technology and equipment to produce. Demand is highly price-inelas-
tic. Imports are insignificant because carbon black cannot easily be transported
over water since it is hydroscopic and absorbs water. There are no signs of im-
minent technological change. There is an industry-wide custom of freight equal-
ization and strong pattern of price leadership. There have been no new entrants
for decades and major integrated petroleum companies have exited or are trying
to exit the industry. Finally, in 1984, there was high capacity utilization with
spot shortages and large price increases.
187. See White Consol. Indus. v. Whirlpool Corp., 612 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D.
Ohio), vacated, 619 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 781 F.2d 1224 (6th Cir.
1986). The court said:
The statistics simply require the Court to look further in examining the
proposed transaction to determine whether or not it is, in fact, anticom-
petitive. While the statistics may appear compelling, the Court consid-
ers them to be simply a warning system which alerts regulators that
there may be competitive problems with the proposed transaction.
When concentrations are high and HHIs change significantly because
of a transaction, those charged with maintaining competitive markets
are put on notice that there may be a problem.
To rely exclusively on statistics would be to confine the Court's
inquiry beyond reason, especially in a case such as this where markets
are highly concentrated to begin with. The plaintiffs' argument that
statistics alone should be sufficient to block this transaction virtually
necessitates the conclusion that any acquisitions by any of the major
firms in this industry are anti-competitive and illegal, regardless of the
19881
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two years of the merger, homogeneity-heterogeneity of the rele-
vant product generally, conduct of firms in the market, etc. In
1984, the revised DOJ Guidelines expanded the number of other
factors and defenses from 10 to 14,188 allowed an efficiency de-
fense 189 where the 1982 DOJ Guidelines had not, 190 and for the
first time, included a failing division as well as the failing firm de-
fense. 19 1 In short, the revised DOJ Guidelines consider virtually
any economic rationale that would demonstrate that concentra-
tion levels overstate the merged firms' actual power. 192 As a re-
sult of the 1984 revisions, the DOJ Guidelines are more lenient
and provide many more opportunities for defense. 93
United States v. Waste Management, Inc. 194 is an extreme exam-
ple of other factors outweighing high concentration levels. In
facts surrounding such an acquisition. The Court considers that view
to be extreme and inconsistent with the letter and the spirit of the De-
partment of Justice's merger guidelines.
612 F. Supp. at 1021.
188. Changing Market Conditions (added in 1984), Financial Condition of
Firms in the Relevant Market (added in 1984), Special Factors Affecting Foreign
Firms (added in 1984), Ease of Entry, Homogeneity-Heterogeneity of the Rele-
vant Product Generally, Degree of Difference Between the Products and Loca-
tions in the Market and the Next-Best Substitutes, Similarities and Differences in
the Products and Locations of the Merging Firms, Information About Specific
Transactions and Buyer Market Characteristics, Ability of Small or Fringe Sell-
ers to Increase Sales (added in 1984), Conduct of Firms in the Market, Market
Performance, Efficiencies, Failing Firm Defense, Failing Division Defense (added
in 1984). Compare 1982 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 15, § III B-C with id., §§ 3.2-
3.5.
189. In the 1984 Guidelines, the DOJ stated that "the Department will con-
sider ... efficiencies in deciding whether to challenge the merger. See 1984 DOJ
Guidelines, supra note 16, § 3.5; see also Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7
of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE. W. RES. L. REv. 381 (1980); Williamson, Economies as
an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699 (1977); Williamson, Economies
as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 68 AMER. EcON. REV. 18 (March
1968), with a correction in 69 AMER. ECON. REV. 954 (1969).
190. The 1982 Guidelines indicated that the DOJ would consider efficiency
claims only in "extraordinary cases". See 1982 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 15,
§ V.A; see also FTC v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp. 528 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. I11. 1981)
(failing company defense applied even though acquired business was division of
larger corporation that was successful in other areas).
191. See 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, §§ 5.1-5.2.
192. The 1982 DOJ Guidelines are not simple rules but read like a chapter
in an industrial organization text; i.e., they leave a wide range of discretion.
Kauper, supra note 136, at 508; see Bronstein, A Review of the Revised Merger Guide-
lines, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 613, 614 (1984). The 1984 Guidelines cause the DOJ
to act like a regulatory agency. But see Clanton, Focusing the Inquiry: Specificity in
Merger Guidelines and Elsewhere, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 430, 431 (1983) (common criti-
cism of 1982 DOJ Guidelines, that it considers too many factors and is therefore
too vague and general, is mistaken).
193. Miller, supra note 16.
194. 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984).
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Waste Management, the Second Circuit held that although the
merged firm's market share in the Dallas trash collection and dis-
posal market was 48.8% (CR4 increased from 68.1% to 75.2%,
and HHI increased from 1493 to 2676195), this market share did
not accurately reflect future market power in view of the ease of
entry by potential competitors into the Dallas market.' 96 It did
not accept the government's claims that economies of scale out-
weigh ease of entry or that consumers may prefer Waste Manage-
ment's services, even at a higher price, over those of a new
entrant because of its "proven track record."' 97 Although the
court acknowledged that there is no persuasive authority for al-
lowing low entry barriers and potential competition to overcome
a strong prima facie showing of high concentration, 98 it said that
the United States Supreme Court has held that appraisal of the
impact of a proposed merger upon competition must take into
account potential competition from firms not presently active in
the relevant product and geographic markets.199 The Court then
used the DOJ Guidelines as an estoppel against the government:
Finally, the Merger Guidelines issued by the government it-
self not only recognize the economic principle that ease
of entry is relevant to appraising the impact upon com-
petition of a merger but also state that it may override all
other factors200. .... If the Department of Justice rou-
tinely considers ease of entry as relevant to determining
195. 588 F. Supp. 498 (S.D. N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984).
196. 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984). The court found that
(1) It is so easy to enter the trash collection market that the relative
competitive strength of a company cannot properly be measured solely
with respect to the existing companies in the market, but must also take
into account potential new entrants. (2) Over the past several years
there has been a trend toward deconcentration, involving steady entry
into the market by new companies....
[The District Court] specifically found that individuals operating
out of their homes can acquire trucks and some containers and com-
pete successfully 'with any other company.'
Id. at 981-82, 983; cf. United States v. Calmar Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1298 (D.NJ.
1985) (district court refused preliminary injunction against proposed acquisition
in dispenser/sprayer industry on grounds that potential entry would prevent un-
justified price increases by merged companies).
197. 612 F. Supp. at 1303.
198. Id. (quoting United States v. Waste Management, Inc. 588 F. Supp.
498 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984)).
199. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 531-38 (1973);
FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Penn-Olin
Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
200. "Ease of Entry If entry into a market is so easy that existing competitors
could not succeed in raising price for any significant period of time, the Depart-
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the competitive impact of a merger, it may not argue to a
court addressing the same issue that ease of entry is
irrelevant. 20 1
The NAAG Guidelines place primary reliance on the HHI
and the size of its increase, that is, they emphasize market struc-
ture at the expense of other factors that may affect the signifi-
cance of market shares and concentration levels. Support for this
general approach is found in United States v. Philadelphia National
Bank, 20 2 in which the Supreme Court held that large market
shares are a convenient proxy for appraising the danger of mo-
nopoly power resulting from a horizontal merger. 203 Where the
DOJ Guidelines opted for flexibility at the cost of predictability,
the NAAG Guidelines stressed the policy objective of maintaining
a decentralized economy by limiting the other factors that affect
the significance of market share and concentration levels to four:
ease of entry within one year of the merger 20 4 (as opposed to the
DOJ's two year period), a history of collusion or oligopolistic be-
havior,20 5 a failing firm defense,20 6 but not a failing division de-
ment is unlikely to challenge mergers in that market." See 1984 DOJ Guidelines,
supra note 16, § 3.3.
201. United States v. Waste Management, Inc. 588 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y.
1983), rev'd, 743 F.2d 976, 982-83 (2d Cir. 1984).
202. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). Note the court stated the following:
We are clear, however, that a merger the effect of which "may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition" is not saved because, on some ultimate
reckoning of social or economic debits and credits, it may be deemed
beneficial. A value choice of such magnitude is beyond the ordinary
limits of judicial competence, and in any event has been made for us
already, by Congress when it enacted the amended § 7. Congress de-
termined to preserve our traditionally competitive economy. It there-
fore proscribed anticompetitive mergers, the benign and the malignant
alike, fully aware, we must assume that some price might have to be
paid.
Id. at 371.
203. Under its rationale, a merger resulting in a larger market share is pre-
sumptively illegal, rebuttable only by a demonstration that the merger will not
have anticompetitive effects. Id. at 362-63.
204. In Laidlaw Acquisition Corp. v. Mayflower Group, Inc., the nation's second
largest private contractor for busing of school children was granted a prelimi-
nary injunction against its largest competitor's hostile takeover offer. 636 F.
Supp. 1513 (S.D. Ind. 1986). In view of the combined market share of the com-
panies, which would have reached 85.9% in the Pacific Northwest, the acquisi-
tion would have produced a firm controlling an undue share of the relevant
markets. Significant barriers to new entry existed in the form of skyrocketing
insurance costs, three-to-five-year contracts, high capitalization costs, perform-
ance bond and experience requirements, and other bid specification
requirements.
205. See, e.g, Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1975 (1987). The Seventh Circuit held that substantial
320 [Vol. 33: p. 281
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fense because the drafters believed that the latter is "highly
susceptible to manipulation and abuse," 20 7 and an efficiency de-
fense that is restricted to situations with a post-merger HHI of
less than 1800. Support for restricting an efficiency defense is
found in Federal Trade Commission v. Proctor & Gamble Co. 208 More-
over, studies have found efficiency from economies of scale do
not increase once a firm has a market share above 14%,209 and
therefore, it is likely that this restriction economizes judicial re-
sources and inflicts no costs on merging firms.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The DOJ and NAAG Horizontal Guidelines adopted nearly
identical concentration level standards concerning mergers sub-
ject to § 7 of the Clayton Act.2 10 The main differences concern:
(1) policy assumptions, (2) market definition methodologies and
(3) what factors other than concentration levels should affect the
decision whether to challenge a merger. With respect to policy
assumptions, the stated policy of the DOJ Guidelines is eclectic,
giving equal weight to several goals: first to prevent increases in
market power, because firms possessing such power can raise
prices to consumers above competitive levels, thereby effecting a
evidence supported an FTC finding that the acquisition of two competing hospi-
tals and management contracts for two more competitors by the largest proprie-
tary hospital chain in the United States constituted a violation of section 7 of the
Clayton Act. The acquisitions reduced the number of competing hospitals in the
Chattanooga, Tennessee, market from I I to 7; the merger made defendant the
second largest provider of hospital services in a highly concentrated market,
CR4 increased from 79% to 91%; Tennessee's certificate-of-need law restricted
entry. The FTC's decision was also supported by the inelastic demand for hos-
pital services and the tradition of cooperation among competing hospitals in
Chattanooga. See also Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 371 (6th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982). One of the reasons the Sixth Circuit
gave for upholding a preliminary injunction against a merger of two oil compa-
nies was that the existence of many joint arrangements and operations among
members of the oil industry already may have provided opportunity for collu-
sion on price and output. This merger, if allowed, would enhance such possibili-
ties of collusion.
206. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 507 (1974);
United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555 (1971).
207. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 6.
208. 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967). ("Possible economies cannot be used as a
defense to illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen com-
petition may also result in economies, but it struck the balance in favor of pro-
tecting competition.").
.209. F. SCHERER, supra note 70, at 91-98; see also Paulter, supra note 32, at
611-15; INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION:, supra note 172, ch.2.
210. See 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, § 3; NAAG Guidelines, supra
note 2, § 4.
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"transfer of wealth from buyers to sellers and a misallocation of
resources"; second "to avoid unnecessary interference with that
larger universe of mergers that are either beneficial or neutral";
and finally, to "interdict competitive problems in their
incipiency." 2 11
The NAAG Guidelines, on the other hand, contain a state-
ment of policies which can only be read as a counterattack on the
Chicago School position that allocative efficiency is the only goal
of antitrust policy. The NAAG Guidelines state that allocative ef-
ficiency is subsidiary to the central purpose of section 7 which is
to prevent firms from attaining market or monopoly power in or-
der to prevent a transfer of wealth from consumers to such firms.
Such mergers are to be prohibited when the trend to harmful
concentration is incipient. Another goal is the prevention of ex-
cessive levels of industrial concentration because of the detrimen-
tal political and social effects of concentrated economic power. 212
With respect to product and geographic market definitions,
the DOJ Guidelines are hypothetical and future oriented. 21 3
They tend to be biased in favor of broad markets and therefore
may systematically understate market shares used to calculate
market concentration, with the result that fewer mergers are chal-
lenged. Recent merger cases and consent decrees were used to
demonstrate that the hypothetical and speculative market defini-
tions of the DOJ guidelines are generally unworkable in the con-
text of litigation. 21 4 On the other hand, the NAAG market
definitions, which use historical data, are similar to those the
courts have traditionally employed. 215 Since the NAAG market
definitions are past oriented, they may be biased toward narrow
markets, and therefore may overstate market shares used to calcu-
late market concentration. 21 6
An analysis of recent merger cases and consent decrees
demonstrated that the DOJ has apparently not been implement-
ing the concentration standard in its own Guidelines. 21 7 (The
211. See 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, § 1.
212. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 2.
213. See 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, § 2.
214. For a discussion of the market definitions in the DOJ Guidelines, see
supra text accompanying notes 67-143.
215. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 3. For a further discussion, see
supra text accompanying notes 67-143.
216. For a discussion of these definitions, see supra text accompanying
notes 67-143.
217. 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1245 at 1056 (Dec. 19,
1985). See also supra text accompanying notes 144-85.
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NAAG, which adopted the DOJ's concentration standard, would
presumably adhere more closely to it than the DOJ has.) The ma-
jor reason for the inconsistency between the DOJ's stated policy
and its actions may be that its Guidelines are based on the incom-
patible assumptions and methodologies of two rival schools of
economic thought. The DOJ's market definition standard shows
the influence of the Chicago School: it is theoretically ideal, but
in practice, generally unworkable. The concentration level stan-
dard shows the influence of the Harvard School: it is definite and
practical, but its precise critical values are arbitrary. Chicago
School adherents, who tend toward advocating a laissez-faire ap-
proach to mergers, view concentration level standards with dis-
dain; they maintain that no demonstrable relation exists between
concentration and market power.2 18 In practice, as demonstrated
by its consent decrees and the merger cases it has prosecuted, 21 9
the DOJ has leaned toward the Chicago School view of mergers
and has tended not to enforce its own concentration standard.
The DOJ's actual policy guide may possibly be inferred from a
footnote in its 1982 Guidelines where it stated that "[t]here is
some economic evidence that, where one or two firms dominate a
market, the creation of a strong third firm enhances competi-
tion." 220 Given the reluctance of the DOJ to challenge mergers, it
has been suggested that the threshold level of concentration at
which mergers will be challenged should be raised.221
With respect to the question of what factors other than con-
centration levels should affect a governmental agency's decision
whether to challenge a merger, the DOJ Guidelines take a flexible
approach. When the DOJ revised its Guidelines in 1984, it in-
creased the number of other factors and defenses from ten to
fourteen. 222 The other factors and defenses were probably ex-
panded in order to both undercut its concentration standard and
bring the Guidelines more in conformity to the DOJ's lenient en-
forcement policy. In current form, the DOJ Guidelines include
virtually any economic rationale that would allow the merged
218. Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd,
669 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1981) rev'don other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 484 (1987).
219. For a discussion of the DOJ's adoption of the Chicago School view of
mergers, see supra text accompanying notes 167-76.
220. See 1982 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 15, § III.A.l.(c) n.33.
221. 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1245 at 1056 (Dec. 19,
1985). For a further discussion, see supra text accompanying notes 144-85.
222. For a discussion of sections III.B-C of the 1982 DOJ Guidelines as
compared to sections 3.2-3.5 of the 1984 DOJ Guidelines, see supra text accom-
panying notes 186-212.
1988]
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firms to demonstrate that concentration levels overstate their ac-
tual market power. On the other hand, the NAAG Guidelines,
which emphasize the concentration level standard as a true guide-
line, limit the number of other factors and defenses that may af-
fect the significance of market shares and concentration levels to
four.
2 2 3
At the beginning of this article it was noted that antimerger
law has come full cycle from Justice Stewart's dissenting remark in
Von's Grocery that "the Government always wins," to FTC Com-
missioner Bailey's dissenting remark in Echlin that "according to
the 'new' economic learning, a merger is almost always legal." It
remains to be seen whether recent events such as the wave of
mergers which seem to be based on considerations of financial
manipulation rather than productivity, the deterioration of the
American balance of international trade and protectionist senti-
ment in Congress (which will enhance the market power of do-
mestic firms), and the secular decline in productivity in the United
States presage the need for a new activist phase in the interpreta-
tion of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. If so, the issuance of the
NAAG Guidelines may well be remembered as heralding the be-
ginning of a new phase in the cycle.
223. There are three other factors plus a failing firm defense. See NAAG
Guidelines, supra note 2, § 5-6. For a discussion of these factors, see supra text
accompanying notes 187-93.
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APPENDIX I
CONCENTRATION RATIOS AND HHI IN THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S' CONSENT
1981-1986
MERGING FIRMS2 MARKET 3  CONCENTRATION
RATIO4
DECREES,
HHI
From-To, Increase
1986-
General Electric; vidicon tubes CR2 = 90% 7740-9852, +2116
RCA 6
Rice Growers Ass'n milling paddy rice CR2 = 63% 3276-4874, + 1598
of Cal; Pacific grown in California CR4 = 95%
Intern'l Rice Mills
7
SpA. Officine gabions used in CR2 = 99%
Maccaffini; Terr river control
Aqua8
Baxter Travenol parenteral solutions, CR3 = 95% 3648-5330, + 1682
Laboratories; fluid administration CR3 = 90% 3037-4408, +1098
American Hospital sets, flow control CR3 = 91% 1919-2319, + 402
Supply9  devices, therapeutic CR3 = 85% 2700-4000, + 1300
hemapheresis CR6 = 90% 1667-2375, + 708
equipment,
surgeons gloves
1985
Newell Co.; Stanley drapery hardware CR4 = 78% 3238-2448, +790
Drapery Hardware used to hang drapes CR6 = 95%
Division
Calmar; Realex sprayer, dispensers, CR2 = 83% 4400-7100, +2700
Corp." sprayer, dispenser CR2 = 79% 4000-6400, +2400
and triggers CR2 = 49% 2300-3000, + 700
Allied Corp.; Signal airturbine starters CR4 = 90% 3335-5310, + 1975
Corp.
Cooper Industries; aviation lighting CR4 = 72% 3107-3863, + 756
division of CR8 = 87%
Westinghouse
Electric Corp.'"
Waste Management; solid waste > 1000 > + 100
SCA Services' 4  collection and >2000
disposal in 20 local
areas, hazardous
waste offsite
treatment and
disposal
1988]
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Alcan Aluminum
Ltd; Atlantic
Richfield Co.' 5
aluminum can body
stock
IBM Corp. mil-spec (military CR2 = 80%
Rolm Corp." specification)
computers
1984
Nat'l Bank and retail and CR2 = 80%
Trust Co. of commercial banking
Norwich; Nat'l Bank services in northern
of Oxford 7  3/4 of Chenango
County, NY
Tribune and local print CR2 = 100%
Sentinel Star Co.; 3 advertising Osceola CR2 = 60%
weekly newspapers County, Fla. local
and 2 "shoppers" advertising Osceola
owned by Luzadder County, Fla.
Publications"
LTV Corp.;Jones & hot rolled sheets CR2 = 21% 871-1047, +176
Laughlin Steel" and strip steel, cold CR2 = 22% 953-1146, + 193
rolled sheets and CR2 = 47% 2190-2898, +708
strip steel, stainless
cold rolled sheets
and strip steel
American Maize- cigars by unit CR4 = 77%
Products Co.; Bayuk volume CR8 = 88%
Cigars0  cigars by dollar CR4 = 67%
volume CR8 = 80%
Beverly Enterprises nursing homes in 4 post-merger share = 73%
(780 nursing local geographic 29% to 48% in each market
homes); Southern markets
Medical Services
2
'
1983
American Brand; home and office post-merger share = 73%
Ofrex Group, Ltd .2 staplers CR4 = 89%
British Columbia Coated groundwood CR5 = 56%
Forest Products, paper in US (used CR8 = 84%
Ltd.; Blandin Paper in magazines-
Co.23  catalogues)
G.Heileman beer in U.S. market CR4 = 83% 1764-1927, + 163
Brewing Co.; Pabst
Brewing Co.,
Olympia Brewing
Co.
24
1982
Stroh Brewery Co.; beer in southeast, CR4 = 92% 2345-2531, + 186
Jos. Schlitz Brewing U.S.
Co.
25
326
CR4 = 88% 2300
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ARA Services;
Means Services
2 - textile rental
services in
Cleveland-Akron-
Lorain, Ohio area,
Columbus, Ohio
area southwest
Virginia-east
Kentucky area
Baldwin-United private mortgage CR4 = 73%
Corp.; MGIC guarantee insurance CR8 = 96%
Investment Corp.2 7
Beatrice Foods Co.; custom CR4 = 89% (Beatrice 50%)
Fiberite Corp. 21 compounded (Fiberlite 50%)
reinforced
thermoplastic,
custom
compounded
reinforced
thermosets
Acorn Engineering vandal-resistant CR2 = 100%
Corp.; Aluminum plumbing fixtures
Plumbing Fixture
Corp.
2 )
Hospital Affiliates inpatient psychiatric
International; care provided by
American Health psychiatric hospitals
Services, Inc.30  and acute care
hospitals not owned
by State of
Louisiana;
submarket of private
psychiatric inpatient
care in all of New
Orleans
1981
Columbia mass market CR4 = 53%
Broadcasting paperback CR8 = 81%
System; Fawcett publishing
Publications
3
'
Harvey Hubbell; underground power CR4 = 70%
Ohio Brass7 2  distribution CR8 = 89%
equipment utilized
in coal mining
E.I.duPont de nylon CR4 = 88%
Nemours & Co.; acrylic fibers CR2 = 76%,
Conoco" CR4 = 88%
The Flintkote Co.; dry-mixed concrete CR2 = 47%
Home-Crete products Wash.- CR2 = 72%
Division of Corsen " Bait. market Phila.-
NY market
1988]
CR4 = 59%
CR4 = 60%
CR4 = 68%
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Wheelabrator-Frye; industrial and power CR2 = 47%
Pullman "  plant chimneys, CR4 = 100%
electric arc furnaces CR2 = 40%
Federal Trade Commission Consent Decree
Texaco, Inc.; (1) manufacture and HHI-634 of HHI-
Getty Oil Co.31! transportation of 3011, depending on
refined light oil assumptions3
7
products; Providence, R.I.,
(2) wholesale HHI-1936
distribution of oil Portland, Me., HHI-
and gasoline in 1463
northeastern U.S.;" NY City, HHI-2658
(3) pipeline HHI-1202 or HHI-
transportation 2429 depending on
Colorado; assumptions 1 HHI-
(4) sale, pipeline 1206
transportation, and
refining of heavy
crude oil in
California"
Because of its importance in terms of size, the consent decree between the Federal
Trade Commission and Texaco is included at the end of this appendix.
'The first firm is the acquiring firm, the second firm or firms are the acquired firms.
Unless otherwise indicated, the geographic market is nationwide.
Concentration ratios are what the post-merger ratios would be if the merger was allowed
without modification.
, The year is the year the consent decree was approved by the courts. Consent decrees
approved in 1981 or later are considered as part of the Reagan Adminstration's record
even if they were begun under the Carter Administration since the current administration
can always drop litigation of which it does not approve.
United States v. General Elec. Co., 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,382 (D.D.C. 1986), 51
Fed. Reg. 25754 (1986).
7 United States v. Rice Growers Ass'n of Cal., 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,288 (E.D.
Cal. 1986).
United States v. S.p.A. Officine Maccaferri, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,168 (D. Md.
1986), 51 Fed. Reg. 8039 (March 7, 1986).
" United States v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 1986-I Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,068
(N.D. I11. 1986), 50 Fed. Reg. 50857 (Dec. 12, 1985).
"' United States v. Newell Co., 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,945 (D. Conn. 1985), 50
Fed. Reg. 14175 (April 10, 1985).
" United States v. Calmar, Inc., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,078 (D. N.J. 1985), 50
Fed. Reg. 27068 (July 1, 1985).
12 United States v. Allied Corp., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,867 (D.D.C. 1985), 50
Fed. Reg. 34019 (Aug. 24, 1985).
" United States v. Cooper Indus., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,688 (D.D.C. 1985), 50
Fed. Reg. 11019 (Mar. 19, 1985).
" United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,652 (D.D.C.
1985), 49 Fed. Reg. 40679 (Oct. 17, 1984).
'5 United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Ltd., 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,427 (W.D. Ky.
1985), 49 Fed. Reg. 40454 (Oct. 16, 1984).
United States v. IBM Corp., 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,439 (D.D.C. 1985), 49 Fed.
Reg. 47122 (Nov. 30, 1984).
" United States v. National Bank and Trust Co. of Norwich, 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,074 (N.D.N.Y. 1984), 49 Fed. Reg. 9630 (March 14, 1984).
' United States v. Tribune Co. and Sentinel Star Co., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,075
(M.D. Fla. 1984), 49 Fed. Reg. 5399 (Feb. 13, 1984).
"' United States v. LTV Corp., 1984-2 Trade Cas. 66,133 (D.D.C. 1984), 49 Fed. Reg.
13603 (April 5, 1984).
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21) United States v. American Maize-Prods. Co., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,033 (M.D.
Fla. 1983), 47 Fed. Reg. 8423 (Feb. 26, 1982).
2) United States v. Beverly Enters., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,052 (M.D. Ga. 1984),
49 Fed. Reg. 9635 (March 14, 1984).
22 United States v. American Brands, Inc., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,276 (S.D.N.Y.
1983), 47 Fed. Reg. 45991 (Oct. 14, 1982).
2 United States v. British Columbia Forest Prods., Ltd., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,280 (D. Min. 1983), 47 Fed. Reg. 57364 (Dec. 23, 1982).
24 United States v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 65,399 (D.
Del. 1983), 47 Fed. Reg. 56064 (Dec. 14, 1982).
21 United States v. Stroh Brewery Co., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,037 (D.D.C. 1982),
47 Fed. Reg. 18,445 (April 29, 1982).
26 United States v. ARA Servs., Inc., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,209 (S.D. Ohio
1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 27164 (June 23, 1982).
27 United States v. Baldwin-United Corp, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,788 (S.D. Ohio
1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 9591.
2 United States v. Beatrice Foods Co., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,698 (D. Minn.
1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 4622 (Feb. 1, 1982).
219 United States v. Acorn Eng'g Co., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,697 (N.D. Cal. 1982),
47 Fed. Reg. 3435 (Jan. 2, 1982).
so United States v. Hospital Affiliates Int'l, Inc., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 64,696 (E.D.
La. 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 1451 (Jan. 13, 1982).
" United States v. CBS, Inc., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 64,478 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), 46 Fed.
Reg. 39916 (Aug. 5, 1981).
52 United States v. Harvey Hubbell, Inc., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 9 64,516 (D. Conn.
1981), 46 Fed. Reg. 47899 (Sept. 30, 1981).
33 United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 9
64,479 (D.D.C. 1981), 46 Fed. Reg. 41640 (Aug. 17, 1981).
" United States v. Flintkote Co., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 64,032 (D.D.C. 1981), 46
Fed. Reg. 16163 (March 11, 1981).
" United States v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 9 64,018 (D.D.C.
1981), 45 Fed. Reg. 64,757 (Sept. 30, 1980).
% 49 Fed. Reg. 8553 (March 7, 1984).
37 The lower HHI figures are based on the assumption of independent action by
northeastern refiners who are joint owners of Colonial Pipeline, a pipeline that runs from
Texas to the northeast; the higher HHI figures are based on the assumption that the
northeastern refiners attempt to maximize joint profits and block expansion of the
pipeline.
These HHI figures are for terminal capacity.
"i' The lower HHI figure is based on capacity and assumes owners of a joint venture
pipeline are competitors; the higher figures assume that the acquisition of Getty would be
treated as a merger of two of the four pipelines serving Rocky Mountain, southwestern and
midwestern states.
"' If as a result of the acquisition, Texaco diverted the Getty heavy crude oil to its own
refining system, it would deprive the non-integrated refiners in the San Francisco area
served by the Getty trunkline of access to heavy crude oil. The HHI is calculated on that
assumption.
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APPENDIX II
DISPOSITION OF CONSENT DECREES OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1-1981-1986
MERGING FIRMS2 MARKET 3 DISPOSITION
1986'
General Electric; RCA vidicon tubes merger allowed after
General Electric divests
itself of tube division
Rice Growers Ass'n of Cal; milling paddy rice grown in merger not allowed, total
Pacific Intern'l Rice Mills California divestiture required
SpA. Oflicine Maccaflini; gabions used in river merger not allowed, total
Terr Aqua control divestiture required
Baxter Travenol parenteral solutions, fluid merger now challenged
Laboratories; American administration sets, flow after divestiture in the five
Hospital Supply control devices, therapeutic product market areas
hemapheresis equipment,
surgeons gloves
1985
Newell Co.; Stanley drapery hardware used to merger not allowed, total
Drapery Hardware Division hang drapes divestiture required
Calmar; Realex Corp. sprayer, dispensers, the DOJ lost at the district
sprayer, dispenser and court level."+ In consent
triggers decree Calmar agreed not
to acquire another firm for
8 years
Allied Corp.; air turbine starters merger by two diversified
Signal Corp. firms not challenged if a
turbine starter business was
divested from either firm
Cooper Industries; division aviation lighting merger not challenged, but
of Westinghouse Electric 10-year prohibition on
Corp. future mergers
Waste Management; SCA solid waste collection and merger not challenged, but
Services disposal in 20 local areas, must divest in all cities
hazardous waste offsite where competition exists
treatment and disposal
Alcan Aluminum Ltd; aluminum can body stock Alcan allowed to retain
Atlantic Richfield Co. stock but must limit
interest in the joint venture
to investment
IBM Corp.; mil-spec (military merger not challenged, but
Rolm Corp. specification) computers IBM must divest Rolm mil-
spec computer division
330
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1984
Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. retail and commercial merger not challenged, but
of Norwich; Nat'l Bank of banking services in Nat'l Bank must divest two
Oxford northern 3/4 of Chenango offices in Norwich and end
County, NY legal protection that
prevents other banks from
opening in Norwich
Tribune and Sentinal Star local print advertising merger not allowed, total
Co.; 3 weekly newspapers Osceola County, Fla. local divestiture required
and 2 "shoppers" owned advertising Osceola
by Luzadder Publications County, Fla.
LTV Corp.; Jones & hot rolled sheets and strip merger not challenged, but
Laughlin Steel steel, cold rolled sheets and must divest Republic's
strip steel, stainless cold Alabama and Ohio plants
rolled sheets and strip steel and no new acquisition for
10 years
American Maize-Products cigars by unit volume, American allowed to buy
Co.; Bayuk Cigars cigars by dollar volume manufacturing facilities, but
not brand names
Beverly Enterprises (780 nursing homes in 4 local merger not challenged, but
nursing homes); Southern geographic markets Beverly required to divest
Medical Services itself of 7 nursing homes
formerly owned by
Southern in 4 areas plus
one home owned by
Beverly
1983
American Brand; Ofrex home and office staplers merger not challenged, but
Group, Ltd. American must divest one
of its stapler brands and
manufacturing facilities
British Columbia Forest Coated groundwood paper merger not challenged, but
Products, Ltd.; Blandin in US (used in magazines- Mead Corp. which owns
Paper Co. catalogues) interest in British Columbia
and competes with Blandin
must hold Blandin separate
from Mead
G.Heileman Brewing Co.; beer in U.S. market merger not challenged, but
Pabst Brewing Co., Heilman must sell 2 of
Olympia Brewing Co. Pabst's 4 breweries and I
of Olympia's 3 breweries
and cannot use Pabst,
Olympia, or Hamm's brand
names
1982
Stroh Brewery Co.; Jos. beer in southeast, U.S. merger not challenged, but
Schlitz Brewing Co. Stroh must divest either
North Carolina or
Tennessee breweries
51
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ARA Services; Means
Services
textile rental services in
Cleveland-Akron-Lorain,
Ohio area, Columbus, Ohio
area southwest Virginia-east
Kentucky area
merger not challenged, but
Means must sell three local
businesses
Baldwin-United Corp.; private mortgage guarantee total divestiture required
MGIC Investment Corp. insurance
Beatrice Foods Co.; custom compounded merger not challenged, but
Fiberite Corp. reinforced thermoplastic, Fiberite must divest
custom compounded thermoplastics and cannot
reinforced thermosets reenter business for 10
years; Beatrice enjoined
from acquiring
thermoplastics firm for 10
years
Acorn Engineering Corp.; vandal-resistant plumbing merger not challenged, but
Aluminum Plumbing fixtures vandal-resistant plumbing
Fixture Corp. in this and previous
acquisitions must be
divested
Hospital Affiliates inpatient psychiatric care merger not challenged, but
International; American provided by psychiatric Hospital Affiliates must
Health Services, Inc. hospitals and acute care divest two psychiatric
hospitals not owned by hospitals in local Louisana
State of Louisana; area and agree not to
submarket of private acquire hospitals in local
psychiatric inpatient care in Louisana area for 10 years
all of New Orleans
1981
Columbia Broadcasting mass market paperback merger not challenged, but
System; Fawcett publishing CBS agrees to sell its mass
Publications market paperback
subsidiary and not acquire
another
Harvey Hubbell; Ohio underground power merger not challenged, but
Brass distribution equipment Hubbell must divest a
utilized in coal mining custom underground power
distribution equipment
facility and no such
acquisition for 10 years
E.I.duPont de Nemours & nylon merger not challenged, but
Co.; Conoco acrylic fibers duPont required to
purchase interest of a
competitor who had an
interest in a joint venture
with Conoco
The Flintkote Co.; Home- dry-mixed concrete merger not challenged, but
Crete Division of Corsen products 2 plants in Virginia and I
Wash.-Bait. market in New Jersey must be
Phila.-NY market divested
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Wheelabrator-Frye;
Pullman
industrial and power plant
chimneys, electric arc
furnaces
merger not challenged, but
must divest chimney
division of Wheelabrator
and electric furnace
division of either firm
Federal Trade Commission Consent Decree
(1) manufacture and
transportation of refined
light oil products;
(2) wholesale distribution
of oil and gasoline in
northeastern U.S.;
7
(3) pipeline transportation
Colorado;
(4) sale, pipeline
transportation, and refining
of heavy crude oil in
California'
merger not challenged, but
Texaco required to divest
Eagle Point refinery in NJ.
and must support proposals
to expand pipeline to N.J.,
require Texaco to divest
Getty's northeast marketing
properties, including
terminals, storage tanks
and retail stations,
divest Getty's pipeline,
refining, and marketing
properties in Rocky
Mountain, southwestern
and midwestern states,
require Texaco to provide
Getty heavy crude oil to
former Getty customers
until mid-1989, offer access
for 10 years to Getty
customers using pipeline in
Los Angeles
Because of its importance in terms of size, the consent decree between the Federal
Trade Commission and Texaco is included at the end of this Appendix.
- The first firm is the acquiring firm, the second firm or firms are the acquired firms.
Unless otherwise indicated, the geographic market is nationwide.
Citations to the cases and to the competitive impact statements are given in Appendix I,
supra.
The year is the year the consent decree was approved by the courts. Consent decrees
approved in 1981 or later are considered as part of the Reagan Adminstration's record
even if they were begun under the Carter Administration since the current administration
can always drop litigation of which it does not approve.
United States v. Calmar, Inc., 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,588 (D. N.J. 1985).
7 These HHI figures are for terminal capacity.
If as a result of the acquisition, Texaco diverted the Getty heavy crude oil to its own
refining system, it would deprive the non-integrated refiners in the San Francisco area
served by the Getty trunkline of access to heavy crude oil. The HHI is calculated on that
assumption.
1988] 333
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